Secrets of RAW By Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd.)
PVSM AVSM VM
11, Silver State, Pilibhit Byepass Road,
Bareilly-243005 (U.P.) INDIA
Tel:-0581-2526650,
Mob: 9411900090, 09999722636
Email-amashokgoel@gmail.com
This is a commentary on a recently released book by a former officer in India’s external spying agency. There have been views and counter-views and occasionally, some of RAW operatives have spoken out of hand. Strangely, one RAW officer, posted in a Gulf mission, tried to denigrate his successor by alleging that he was using the diplomatic bag to smuggle gold.
Nonetheless, there has been some serious debate on whether the government should have released the tapes of conversation between Gen Musharaf and his Chief of Army Staff on the occupation of Kargil heights. Of course, Pakistan lied and was nailed by the conversation. But still, one the Indian government let it be known that its agencies could monitor the highest level of conversation between the Pakistani military brass, the source dried up.
Needless to say that it was an invaluable source.
Maj Gen VK Singh’s recent book has sent quite a flutter in the intelligence fraternity in particular and has given the media another masala subject to ponder and deliberate upon.
I also happened to serve an outfit of RAW, the Aviation Research Center (ARC), as the Operations Manager for three years from Feb 97 to 31 Dec. 99.
My predecessor had called me up and advised me not to accept this deputation, as he had felt most unhappy 9during his two years tenure) mostly due to administrative arrangements and some what lopsided hierarchy. Since I had been on the advisory panel of the ARC during the late 1980s to establish the new inductions. I was quite familiar with the working environment. I accepted the deputation as directed by the Air Hq and joined the outfit during the first week of Feb 1997. Of course, the was against the advice of my predecessor.
A fleet of more than 30 aircraft (fixed & rotary using), half a dozen air bases and about 1500 personnel spread out at the various places, I set the targets for myself: high serviceability, fully operational aircrews, high standards of maintenance and fulfillment of operational tasks.
Overall objective” 100 per cent mission accomplishment. And I can say that this was achieved within the first 3 to 6 months.
All I can the say is that the organization provided an open platform, to use one’s managerial skills, administrative acumen, and professional approach to achieve the organizational objectives. No such directives were given by my superiors. I had set by goals, I was responsible for my actions and I also set my objectives to ensure my accountability.
The organization, up to the highest level, provided support to achieve all these institutional objectives. That is all an operative can ask for in an intelligence outfit.
I served with three RAW chiefs- Mitra, Arvind Dave and AS Dullat, My immediate bosses were Mahajan and Billy Bedi , each of them an officer of impeccable character, excellent as human being and through professional.
Having gone through Maj Gen VK Sing’s book’s 12 chapter, I did not feel any chilling feeling. The first three chapters are dedicated to his years with the Indian Army, the next two on very mundane issues of how the offices are located and to whom you report, and how many flower pots at the entrance of an office etc.
One has to understand that in an organization like RAW – or for the matter in any intelligence organization-people have to work on the need-to-know basis.
Having an office on the first, second, or third floor does not matter and certainly did not affect the functioning of the organization. People were available to the senior executives for interaction of issuance of any directions.
Whether there are name plated or not outside the offices of various executives or personnel, id decided by the organization itself as part of its cultural on how to transact its business. People can be at different places;
What matters is that the required connectivity should be there. Even the Army and Navy officers are widely dispersed in South Block, Send Bhawan, and hutments and even farther.
Maj Gen VK Singh has talked about signal intelligence in three chapters. May be for an Army formation for its operational task, the signal Regiments plays a role which a commander cannot relegate elsewhere. That is a role peculiar to the Army.
But for the conduct of external intelligence, there are may sources, humint, personal contacts, publications, satellites, and other sources of technical intelligence. As regards the interception of two generals being monitored and its tapes being handed over to Nawaz Sharif, RAW couldn’t have this on its own.
This was deliberate decision at the highest political level. May be the dividends in terms of political and diplomatic gains were considered higher, and hence the assessment. Judgments are relevant to the time they are taken at.
It should be well understood that intelligence organizations work at the behest of their political masters. It would be appropriate to quote an incident here.
During Oct 1998, the Prime Minister’s Officer (PMO) advised RAW and ARC to go slow on surveillance of Pakistani activities to help ease the tension between the two countries, and build a friendly atmosphere. The focus was on Indian Prime Minister AB Vajpayee’s Bus Yatra (journey) to Lahore.
The Pakistani military establishment, particularly the Inter services Intelligence (ISI) has not shown any such gesture. But despite that, New Delhi wanted to show a sense of goodwill. It was conveyed from the highest quarters that peace is important for both the countries, and sooner or later, Islamabad should evolve a sense in its own interest that peace with India would mean economic prosperity with its own people.
Only when there were reports of Pakistani incursions in the Kargil heights that the ARC was tasked to check if the Pakistanis had indeed crossed the Line of Control to the Indian side and violated the border agreement.
They had.
We saw six Pakistani Mi 17 helicopters 10-12 km inside of the Indian side of LoC, mules and camps, in Mushkoh Valley, and Kargil and Dras sectors. Their pictures were immediately given to the then Defence Minister. George Fernandes, and the Chief of Staff of the Indian Army. In fact Fernandes expressed shock that Pakistani government talked of peace on the one hand and sent its troops to across the LoC on the other. What lies and double-speak, he had commented, and asked the Army to immediately address the intrusion.
And we know the consequences. The Pakistanis initially denied-lies being a part of their state culture always-and later tried to rationalize it when caught.
There are only two chapters, 11 and 12, where Maj Gen V.K. Singh has expressed serous apprehension of the organizational functioning.
May be he was in an era where a particular set of people could not enforce and continue with the organizational cultural. A certain decline seemed to have set in and that is why Tharakkan, an outsider, was brought in to head the organization.
There was a time when the Intelligence Bureau Chief and later, the RAW Chief, could meet the Prime Minister at any time. The hearsay is that Mallick and Kao used to brief the prime Minister every morning. They did not need an appointment.
When Morarji Desai succeeded India Gandhi in 1977 after the Emergency, he did try to distance the RAW chief from himself, who was the legendary RN Kao, and asked him to go to the Cabinet Secretary first.
03 RAW Chiefs IO served with also enjoyed a fairly decent equation with the higher political leadership.
To quote an incident, the Army and Naval Chiefs had complained to the Defence Minister about inadequate and ineffective functioning Raw and its other outfits. A briefing cum presentation was planned in the Minister’s office in April 1998.
This was attended by the Minister, George Fernandez, as well as the then Defence Secretary. RAW was represented by the RAW Chief, three addl/spl secretaries, Billy and myself. The Minister and the Defence Seretaries were more than satisfied.
The inadequacies in fact were identified on the part of the Army and Naval Headquarters; there was no proper dissemination of the information given to them.
Even during the Kargil operations, despite the clear picture of Pakistani helicopters well inside the Indian side of LoC, some Indian generals in the northern sector kept on insisting that there were no Pakistani troops inside India but only 60 to 80 infiltrators. The Pakistan President would have been the happiest with them.
The Indian Army is yet to say what impact this perception, ignorance, or mindset of a couple of generals at the command level had on the Kargil operations.
The K Subrahmanyam Committee, which looked into the Kargil War, did not go into the Army’s operational details, and I understand that he has mentioned that he was not aware of this mindset of the top army brass on the operational area.
Perhaps the Army should have a re-look, if only to ensure that mistakes at the command level do not happen ever again Was it the system at the Army HQ which failed to convey the ARC reports to the Army Brass in the northern sector, or they deliberately ignored it so as not to own responsibility for the Pakistani intrusion.
Reference to Subrahmanyam Committee
A lot has been talked about the Subrahmanyam committee.
Sixteen meetings were held between the Committee and ARC and RAW from August 1999 to Dec 2000.
I quote relevant portions: “No intelligence failures had been attributed on account of functioning of RAW and ARC. However, certain equipment inadequacies were highlighted such as:
(a) Satellite imagery resolution.
(b) All weather capability with sub-meter resolution
(c) Availability of UAVs
(d) Better coordination
Some of the observations of the Subrahmanyam Committee are relevant. It says in its report:
“However, it acknowledge that the Director, Intelligence Bureau (IB) did convey certain inputs on activities in areas under Gilgit-based FCNA (Force Commander Northern Areas) of Pakistan to the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the Cabinet Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Director General Military operations (DGMO).
There is a general lack of awareness of the critical importance of and the need for assessed intelligence at all levels. JIC reports do not receive the attention they deserve at the political and higher bureaucratic levels. Of the 45 intelligence inputs generated between May 1998 and April 1999, only 25% went through the JIC.
A Kargil-type situation could perhaps have been avoided had the Indian Army followed a policy of Siachenisation to plug upheld gaps along the 168 km stretch from Kaobal Gali to Chorbat La… such a dispersal of Forces to hold uninhabited territory of no strategic value would have dissipated considerable military strength and effort and would not have at all been cost effective. The alternative should be a a credible declaratory policy of swiftly punishing wanton and willful violation of the sanctity of the LoC.
Specific to Kargil Operation
The Army HQ asked for photographic intelligence of the LOC in Oct 1998. After that no requisition was given by them. Only on 10 May 1999, a requisition was given to photograph our own territory. A number of missions were flown and I would like to mention the comments of the Chief of Air Staff of the operation, sent to director ARC:
“I would like to place on record my sincere appreciation for the sterling work done by the ARC during Operation Vijay. The electronic and optical information provided by the ARC before and during the actual operations was of immense value to the conduct of air strikes.
The co-operation extended by your men in carrying out missions under difficult and demanding circumstances in an eloquent testimony to the excellent leadership and guidance provided by you to the organization.
I am confident that the co-ordination between our organizations achieved during the operation will continue in times to come.”
Not only that there used to be nearly daily meetings between the DGMI or even with the Chief of Army Staff, Gen VP Malik. I quote the Gen VP Malik as saying:
“ I highly appreciate the efforts of ARC in making our tasks easier. But you will appreciate I cannot publicly acknowledge these contributions.
But I have no hesitation in admitting that it was with your organization’s sterling effort that the Army could link up and correlate their operational plans and execute them timely and successful; otherwise the causality figures could have been much higher.”
Even after my retirement whenever Gen Malik me, he always complimented the efforts of the ARC.
Every organization develops its own culture. Some allow more freedom, which actually help an officer, and an operative, to set the direction of his goals and objectives. As long as there is responsibility, this should be okay.
There are enough checks and balances in the form of National Security Council and National Security Advisor, and checks can only restrict the flexibility of the organizational functioning of intelligence bodies. That may not be wise idea.
(The views expressed by Subrahmanyam Committee u the author are based on his personal experience and do not necessarily reflect any policy of this publication).
Monday, May 24, 2010
TERRORISM AND OUR RESPONSE
Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd.)
PVSM AVSM VM
11, Silver State, Pilibhit Byepass Road,
Bareilly-243005 (U.P.) INDIA
Tel:-0581-2526650,
Mob: 9411900090, 09999722636
Email-amashokgoel@gmail.com
TERRORISM AND OUR RESPONSE
2008 the year of terror. Major incidents where Indian cities were on line of fire (Jaipur 13 May 2008, Bangalore 25 July, Ahemdabad 26 July, Surat 29 July Delhi 13 Sep, Delhi 27 Sep, Malegaon 29 Sep, Guwhati and other places in Assam 30 Oct and finally Mumbai 26-29 Nov)
The terrorist attack in Mumbai (26/11) through a new medium (Sea route) and Fidayean attack has added a new dimension. This resulted in 183 dead (including 28 foreign nationals) and nearly 300 injured. This catastrophe is being compared with 9/11 of the US and sent the electronic media, the diplomats, security and defence analysts into a frenzy. Hundreds or even thousands of articles and essays have appeared all over in magazines and National dailies. To day nearly forty days have lapsed since 26/11 but even now this frenzy continues. Not only that state CM (Chief Minister) and “Home Minister” had to go home. Even the Union Home Minister was packed off. India’s top leadership have spared no effort in shouting on top of their voices that Pakistan is the “Perpetrator of all this Terror Attacks”. Pakistan being the perpetrator in nothing new. Pakistan would like to see India bleed and bleed continuously and as long as they can.
Pakistan was built on hatred for India, US has been a collaborator since the time Pakistan came into being, member of SEATO & CENTO in the early years. Pak & US came much closer after the Soviets entered Afghanistan and installed a pro Soviet Govt. Americans saw this as a design of “Soviet Expansionism” to the east. American had to halt this expansion of the Soviets. They could not find a better ally and partner than Pakistan, not only that this could please the Chinese as well indirectly. The US along with CIA & ISI of Pakistan worked on a strategy to prop up groups with in Afghanistan who were opposed to the Soviet occupation. CIA & ISI created Taliban, hard-core fundamentalist group to over throw the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The Taliban ably trained and motivated succeeded in their mission and over threw the soviet Forces. This creation and success of Taliban in throwing out a mighty power (of that time) legitimized “Global Terrorism”.
India faced the terror situation first in Punjab in early eighties. The same was handled firmly and differently and contained. J&K was brewing up with the calls of separatists and dissents from time to time. How we have fared in last twenty years in reacting to threats and demands of the terrorist needs a recall and analysis, to appreciate how we have allowed these elements to be on the upper edge.
One cannot forget the first of such an act on 8 Dec 1989. That was the day when Rubaiya Sayed (daughter of Mofti Mohammed Syed, who was then the home Minister of V P Singh Govt at the Center) was kidnapped by the militants in Srinagar. The Kidnappers demanded the release of militants who were in jail. The Govt succumbed within no time, and five hard core militants were released on 13 Dec 1989. This very soft approach changed the security scenario in the valley. Within no time chaos had commenced, Pandits, academicians, defence personnel were targeted at open and public places. And the valley was now gripped with terror.
The second such incident can be recalled of the year 1995. It was on 5 Jul 1995 six foreign nationals were taken hostage by a terrorist group “Al Faran” consisting of fourteen militants. American hostage escaped and was luckily saved by an Army Chopper. A Norwegian was beheaded and his body was thrown on the streets of Anantnag. As a follow up of these ghastly acts a task force was created. The task force assembled at Srinager (15 corps Hq). The task force had the elements of the Army, NSG and the Air Force. (Author was the Air borne force Cdr.) Not going into many details suffice to say by 9 Sep 1995 the task force had full knowledge of the hide out of the militant group, Al Faran. Then COAS had flown in to Awantipur and a presentation was made on 14 Sep 1995, that the force is really to strike. (Force had done night drills at similar heights at Gulmarg on 11/12 night Sept). Than COAS went quite satisfied, On 18 Sep 1995 a message was received, that the CMG would like to know if the task force could give guarantee on the safety of the hostages in this operation. Which fool could give such a guarantee? On 21 Sep 1994 the task force was asked to disperse and told, if required they would be recalled. More than 13 years have lapsed and that day never came. CMG (Crisis Management Group consisted of cabinet secretary, home secretary, defence secretary, foreign secretary and the ambassadors of those countries whose nationals were taken hostages). Later it was also learnt that the then Governor of J&K (whose was a former Army Chief) had also opposed the operation for the reasons best known to him.
The third security failure and internationally known hijacking of IC-814 on 24 Dec 1999 was the most shameful and regrettable event of this decade. Hijacked aircraft had landed at Amritsar and was on ground for more than an hour was allowed to take off for Lahore (just with 15 minutes fuel), we should hang our heads in shame.
There were half a dozen ways to incapacitate the aircraft while landing, or when parked. One hundred and fifty commandos of the Punjab Police had surrounded the aircraft with in no time though NSG and all other relevant actions were initialed. What happened ultimately that is release of three terrorists held in our jails for last 5 years, they were Omar Shiekh, Maulana Massod Azhar and a Kashmiri separatist Lat ram. There three terrorist were picked up in a Gulf Stream duly escorted by them RAW chief from Srinagar & Jammu. These three terrorist were put on an Indian Air lines plane. They were duly escorted by Jaswant Singh who was a Cabinet Minister in the NDA Govt in power at that time. Three hard core terrorist planners and thinkers were duly exchanged for the passenger’s on board the flight IC – 814.
In all three incidents (Rubiaya Sayed 8 Dec 89, Foreigners Hostage crisis-Aug, Sep- 1995, Hijacking of IC – 814) we did not respond in an aggressive and firm manner. We reflected indecisiveness and politically weakness for hard decisions.
Whenever we talk about “terrorism” we should remember Kargil as well. That was the longest and most well planned terrorist act by Pakis. It was planned directly by the top most military leadership of Pakistan. Though it happened prior to hijacking of IC-814, but its reasons and fall out are important “Indian Political Leadership” was over whelmed with the forthcoming “Bus Yatra” in Feb 1999. PMO had advised to go slow on Pak on intelligence gathering activities. This seems to have percolated down in military establishment as well. And we faced the biggest military challenge of our security lapse along J&K. We lost nearly 600 men and young officer. Due to folly of our “Political Masters” and “Top Military Leadership”.
26/11 and thereafter has sent the whole nation into frenzy . This was a unique attack of a kind. A group of well trained and highly motivated group of ten Fidayeen’s (Suicide attackers) sailed through Indian waters and struck some “Elite Destination” in the economic capital of India, Mumbai, leaving nearly 180 dead and more than 300 injured.
The writings, of commentates have said a lot. US secretary of state and British Prime Minster were in India within first week of the massacre. The reasons our simple, the region in now termed as the most “Volatile and Dangerous zone”
Pakistan is a deeply wounded state from India the reason are.
· Partition 1947.
· Annexation of majority states (Muslim) into Indian union, acquiring a minority status.
· Defeat of Pakistani raiders in 47-48.
· India’s Pokhran – 1 – 1974.
· Dismemberment of Pakistan, 1971 war, creation of Bangladesh.
· Surrender of Pakistan Army with 93000 Pow’s on 16 Dec 1971.
· Surrender of Bhutto - Simla agreement 1972.
· Kargil war -1999, unconditional withdrawal of Pakistani “Terrorists”.
· 2004-2008 Growing Indo US relations.
· Indo/US Nuclear Deal.
· Pak in Turmoil due US/Pakistan alliance on “War on Terror”.
Pak would like to see India bleed the jihadis logic in employing soft state India as their laboratory has been that if they can bleed the world’s largest democracy through novel technique for application against the tougher free societies in the west.
We reflect more of an emotive approach than realistic & practical. We have the intelligence, we have the security personnel well trained and motivated. But we fail. We have always responded in a manner to gain political advantage rather than react in larger national interest. We are arguing “Actionable information’s’ or not, NSG was delayed, these are week statements as we always try to save the organization and their masters.
We would blame every existing mechanism, and would not squarely and directly put the blameworthiness. And we land up creating new agencies or proliferate the assets. NIA has already been created. We are looking for additional Coastal command, NSG should have their own aircraft like etc (though there was no delay on the despatch of NSG from Delhi by ARC Aircraft) Rather punishing those who were guilty of ignoring the early signals, we all are moving ahead of doing every thing, rather than looking at failure & remedies.
Not only that proliferation of “Gallantry Awards” were not spared. One organization recommended even award of “Ashok Chakra” (Nation’s highest peace time gallantry award) to all 12 police officer’s killed. Don’t be emotive we should be more realistic with this yardstick all-military personnel killed during Kargil should have been decorated with the “Nation Highest Gallantry Award”.
So much has been written about state sponsored terror. Public has been sounded on military action, hot pursuit, limited military action, to dismantle terrorists camps in POK. These may not find a favourable response and the same has been adequately reflected in the print media. We had this option of “limited offensive in POK” only during Kargil conflict but our political leadership displayed lack of foresight and proactive aggressive approach.
We have been quite aggressive in our diplomatic offensive this time. A “Diplomatic Offensive” not only now but this should become a state policy. Global terrorism has acquired a greater menace then even nuclear-armed open & clandestine states, responsible or irresponsible states. United Nations should create an international mechanism where, all states should be subject to inspection of terrorist related activities.” International mechanism should be set up to extradite the terrorist from the state and law fully tried, or should be tried through “International Court of Justice”.
India has to launch an aggressive diplomatic offensive to woo China & Saudia Arabia two great supporters of Pak in their defence and economic built up.
We have to look total indigenous solution to mange or contain terror. Diplomatic offensive a “National Political Consensus” do not politicize “terror” to grain some votes, First and foremost political leadership is to show maturity, firmness, statesmanship. To conclude finally the words of a well-known strategic analysist are awakening “while Pakistan is guilty of sponsoring terror and making the country an easy prey. Make no mistake if Pakistan is to dismantle its state reared terror complex, India’s leaders will have to first dismantle their terror “Emboldening Outlook”
PVSM AVSM VM
11, Silver State, Pilibhit Byepass Road,
Bareilly-243005 (U.P.) INDIA
Tel:-0581-2526650,
Mob: 9411900090, 09999722636
Email-amashokgoel@gmail.com
TERRORISM AND OUR RESPONSE
2008 the year of terror. Major incidents where Indian cities were on line of fire (Jaipur 13 May 2008, Bangalore 25 July, Ahemdabad 26 July, Surat 29 July Delhi 13 Sep, Delhi 27 Sep, Malegaon 29 Sep, Guwhati and other places in Assam 30 Oct and finally Mumbai 26-29 Nov)
The terrorist attack in Mumbai (26/11) through a new medium (Sea route) and Fidayean attack has added a new dimension. This resulted in 183 dead (including 28 foreign nationals) and nearly 300 injured. This catastrophe is being compared with 9/11 of the US and sent the electronic media, the diplomats, security and defence analysts into a frenzy. Hundreds or even thousands of articles and essays have appeared all over in magazines and National dailies. To day nearly forty days have lapsed since 26/11 but even now this frenzy continues. Not only that state CM (Chief Minister) and “Home Minister” had to go home. Even the Union Home Minister was packed off. India’s top leadership have spared no effort in shouting on top of their voices that Pakistan is the “Perpetrator of all this Terror Attacks”. Pakistan being the perpetrator in nothing new. Pakistan would like to see India bleed and bleed continuously and as long as they can.
Pakistan was built on hatred for India, US has been a collaborator since the time Pakistan came into being, member of SEATO & CENTO in the early years. Pak & US came much closer after the Soviets entered Afghanistan and installed a pro Soviet Govt. Americans saw this as a design of “Soviet Expansionism” to the east. American had to halt this expansion of the Soviets. They could not find a better ally and partner than Pakistan, not only that this could please the Chinese as well indirectly. The US along with CIA & ISI of Pakistan worked on a strategy to prop up groups with in Afghanistan who were opposed to the Soviet occupation. CIA & ISI created Taliban, hard-core fundamentalist group to over throw the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The Taliban ably trained and motivated succeeded in their mission and over threw the soviet Forces. This creation and success of Taliban in throwing out a mighty power (of that time) legitimized “Global Terrorism”.
India faced the terror situation first in Punjab in early eighties. The same was handled firmly and differently and contained. J&K was brewing up with the calls of separatists and dissents from time to time. How we have fared in last twenty years in reacting to threats and demands of the terrorist needs a recall and analysis, to appreciate how we have allowed these elements to be on the upper edge.
One cannot forget the first of such an act on 8 Dec 1989. That was the day when Rubaiya Sayed (daughter of Mofti Mohammed Syed, who was then the home Minister of V P Singh Govt at the Center) was kidnapped by the militants in Srinagar. The Kidnappers demanded the release of militants who were in jail. The Govt succumbed within no time, and five hard core militants were released on 13 Dec 1989. This very soft approach changed the security scenario in the valley. Within no time chaos had commenced, Pandits, academicians, defence personnel were targeted at open and public places. And the valley was now gripped with terror.
The second such incident can be recalled of the year 1995. It was on 5 Jul 1995 six foreign nationals were taken hostage by a terrorist group “Al Faran” consisting of fourteen militants. American hostage escaped and was luckily saved by an Army Chopper. A Norwegian was beheaded and his body was thrown on the streets of Anantnag. As a follow up of these ghastly acts a task force was created. The task force assembled at Srinager (15 corps Hq). The task force had the elements of the Army, NSG and the Air Force. (Author was the Air borne force Cdr.) Not going into many details suffice to say by 9 Sep 1995 the task force had full knowledge of the hide out of the militant group, Al Faran. Then COAS had flown in to Awantipur and a presentation was made on 14 Sep 1995, that the force is really to strike. (Force had done night drills at similar heights at Gulmarg on 11/12 night Sept). Than COAS went quite satisfied, On 18 Sep 1995 a message was received, that the CMG would like to know if the task force could give guarantee on the safety of the hostages in this operation. Which fool could give such a guarantee? On 21 Sep 1994 the task force was asked to disperse and told, if required they would be recalled. More than 13 years have lapsed and that day never came. CMG (Crisis Management Group consisted of cabinet secretary, home secretary, defence secretary, foreign secretary and the ambassadors of those countries whose nationals were taken hostages). Later it was also learnt that the then Governor of J&K (whose was a former Army Chief) had also opposed the operation for the reasons best known to him.
The third security failure and internationally known hijacking of IC-814 on 24 Dec 1999 was the most shameful and regrettable event of this decade. Hijacked aircraft had landed at Amritsar and was on ground for more than an hour was allowed to take off for Lahore (just with 15 minutes fuel), we should hang our heads in shame.
There were half a dozen ways to incapacitate the aircraft while landing, or when parked. One hundred and fifty commandos of the Punjab Police had surrounded the aircraft with in no time though NSG and all other relevant actions were initialed. What happened ultimately that is release of three terrorists held in our jails for last 5 years, they were Omar Shiekh, Maulana Massod Azhar and a Kashmiri separatist Lat ram. There three terrorist were picked up in a Gulf Stream duly escorted by them RAW chief from Srinagar & Jammu. These three terrorist were put on an Indian Air lines plane. They were duly escorted by Jaswant Singh who was a Cabinet Minister in the NDA Govt in power at that time. Three hard core terrorist planners and thinkers were duly exchanged for the passenger’s on board the flight IC – 814.
In all three incidents (Rubiaya Sayed 8 Dec 89, Foreigners Hostage crisis-Aug, Sep- 1995, Hijacking of IC – 814) we did not respond in an aggressive and firm manner. We reflected indecisiveness and politically weakness for hard decisions.
Whenever we talk about “terrorism” we should remember Kargil as well. That was the longest and most well planned terrorist act by Pakis. It was planned directly by the top most military leadership of Pakistan. Though it happened prior to hijacking of IC-814, but its reasons and fall out are important “Indian Political Leadership” was over whelmed with the forthcoming “Bus Yatra” in Feb 1999. PMO had advised to go slow on Pak on intelligence gathering activities. This seems to have percolated down in military establishment as well. And we faced the biggest military challenge of our security lapse along J&K. We lost nearly 600 men and young officer. Due to folly of our “Political Masters” and “Top Military Leadership”.
26/11 and thereafter has sent the whole nation into frenzy . This was a unique attack of a kind. A group of well trained and highly motivated group of ten Fidayeen’s (Suicide attackers) sailed through Indian waters and struck some “Elite Destination” in the economic capital of India, Mumbai, leaving nearly 180 dead and more than 300 injured.
The writings, of commentates have said a lot. US secretary of state and British Prime Minster were in India within first week of the massacre. The reasons our simple, the region in now termed as the most “Volatile and Dangerous zone”
Pakistan is a deeply wounded state from India the reason are.
· Partition 1947.
· Annexation of majority states (Muslim) into Indian union, acquiring a minority status.
· Defeat of Pakistani raiders in 47-48.
· India’s Pokhran – 1 – 1974.
· Dismemberment of Pakistan, 1971 war, creation of Bangladesh.
· Surrender of Pakistan Army with 93000 Pow’s on 16 Dec 1971.
· Surrender of Bhutto - Simla agreement 1972.
· Kargil war -1999, unconditional withdrawal of Pakistani “Terrorists”.
· 2004-2008 Growing Indo US relations.
· Indo/US Nuclear Deal.
· Pak in Turmoil due US/Pakistan alliance on “War on Terror”.
Pak would like to see India bleed the jihadis logic in employing soft state India as their laboratory has been that if they can bleed the world’s largest democracy through novel technique for application against the tougher free societies in the west.
We reflect more of an emotive approach than realistic & practical. We have the intelligence, we have the security personnel well trained and motivated. But we fail. We have always responded in a manner to gain political advantage rather than react in larger national interest. We are arguing “Actionable information’s’ or not, NSG was delayed, these are week statements as we always try to save the organization and their masters.
We would blame every existing mechanism, and would not squarely and directly put the blameworthiness. And we land up creating new agencies or proliferate the assets. NIA has already been created. We are looking for additional Coastal command, NSG should have their own aircraft like etc (though there was no delay on the despatch of NSG from Delhi by ARC Aircraft) Rather punishing those who were guilty of ignoring the early signals, we all are moving ahead of doing every thing, rather than looking at failure & remedies.
Not only that proliferation of “Gallantry Awards” were not spared. One organization recommended even award of “Ashok Chakra” (Nation’s highest peace time gallantry award) to all 12 police officer’s killed. Don’t be emotive we should be more realistic with this yardstick all-military personnel killed during Kargil should have been decorated with the “Nation Highest Gallantry Award”.
So much has been written about state sponsored terror. Public has been sounded on military action, hot pursuit, limited military action, to dismantle terrorists camps in POK. These may not find a favourable response and the same has been adequately reflected in the print media. We had this option of “limited offensive in POK” only during Kargil conflict but our political leadership displayed lack of foresight and proactive aggressive approach.
We have been quite aggressive in our diplomatic offensive this time. A “Diplomatic Offensive” not only now but this should become a state policy. Global terrorism has acquired a greater menace then even nuclear-armed open & clandestine states, responsible or irresponsible states. United Nations should create an international mechanism where, all states should be subject to inspection of terrorist related activities.” International mechanism should be set up to extradite the terrorist from the state and law fully tried, or should be tried through “International Court of Justice”.
India has to launch an aggressive diplomatic offensive to woo China & Saudia Arabia two great supporters of Pak in their defence and economic built up.
We have to look total indigenous solution to mange or contain terror. Diplomatic offensive a “National Political Consensus” do not politicize “terror” to grain some votes, First and foremost political leadership is to show maturity, firmness, statesmanship. To conclude finally the words of a well-known strategic analysist are awakening “while Pakistan is guilty of sponsoring terror and making the country an easy prey. Make no mistake if Pakistan is to dismantle its state reared terror complex, India’s leaders will have to first dismantle their terror “Emboldening Outlook”
“As I Saw it”
Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd.)
PVSM AVSM VM
11, Silver State, Pilibhit Byepass Road,
Bareilly-243005 (U.P.) INDIA
Tel:-0581-2526650,
Mob: 9411900090, 09999722636
Email-amashokgoel@gmail.com
“As I Saw it”
Kargil
Adventure for Pak
Blunder for India
Victory for those Who Perished
Kargil -99 caused the biggest flutter in the Indian subcontinent. This brought the two neighbors close to the nuclear holocaust inspite of the fact that we were far away from a full fledged declared war of the yester years (1965-1971).
A large number of books and reviews have been written by military leaders & civilian defence analyst. Not only that a high level committee was set up under the steward ship of the most experienced and renowned defence & security analyst of the country Mr. K Subramaniam. Most interestingly the two books which talk most eloquently – one by General VP Malik (Retd.) who was the Army Chief during the period of Kargil war and the other by Shri LK Advani who was Dy PM ( a defacto PM) and the Home Minister of the Govt. (NDA Govt. from April 98 to May 2004) are actually main actors of the Kargil making .
As the anniversary of the Kargil gets closer the main actors of the event become more vocal and anticulative in palming off the responsibility and shaking off their lapses. What prompted me to write this article was the news item in the “Hindustan Times” of 19 Jun 2008. “Lack of Visualization led to Kargil: - Gen Malik. In a foreword to book “Indian Army vision 2020” Gen Malik writes “ The Fact is that even after 60 years of independence, knowledge and experience of defence and military issues is lacking in most of our political leaders and civilian bureaucrats”. Though not sharing their own lapses and neglect of responsibilities.
Much has been written about the historical and military perspective of the Kashmir issue since independence. So I shall confine my self to Kargil as “I Saw it”, from the closest quarter.
The biggest players of this event were:-
(a) The Govt. the highest echelon of the Political Leadership.
(b) The top rug of the military leadership – The Army Chief, GOC-in-C Northern Command,15 Corps Cdr , and the 3 Div Cdr.
(c) The intelligence agencies primarily the IB & RAW.
(d) The role of Air Power.
(e) And the role played by the dedicated and committed soldiers and the junior level leaders. Who saved the situation of the fiasco created by our senior (Political & Military) leaders.
The Role of the Political leadership
May 1998 was the pinnacle of the NDA Govt. Having done the nuclear test in May and put India in the nuclear power list of the Nations , the biggest strategic achievement. Now the aim was to resolve the Kashmir issue for ever or create such a diplomatic environment that Kashmir issue should be freezed for ever. So that Vajpayee/Advani duo could go in the annals of the history. Political leadership was keen to encash the political gains of these two events. Hectic diplomatic activity had commenced. Vajpayee was overly keen to establish a political dialogue at the earliest with his counter part in Pakistan. This journey also was to be formalized in a dramatic manner to invite maximum media attention. Hectic activity commanced in Sep 1998. To the extent “PMO directed the RAW in Oct 98 (ARC who collects aerial intelligence”) to go slow on Pak. This kind of a directive was to send a message across the border that all our intentions are towards normalization of relations Vajpayee went to Lahore by “Bus” the famous “Bus Yatra” in Feb 99. It is a well known fact that Musharraf The Army Chief of the Pak did not show up with full respects to the visiting head of a neighboring country who was purely on a good will and a friendly mission. An indication enough for any leadership with foresight and insight to the astute feelings of an adventurous military leader like Musharraf.
May be this massage of Oct 98 “Go slow on Pak” would have trickled down to the Indian Army leadership as well, and made them complacent down the lime.
It is a well known fact that Srinagar Leh axis runs closest to the LOC in Dras –Kargil Sector. Not only that the terrain on the Indian side is hostile to defend, where as the terrain on Pakistan side is favorable to launch an offensive. Strategically Pakistan always intended to block/ disrupt or permanently dislocate the “Srinagar Leh Highway” in Dras Kargil Sector.
After being commissioned in the year 1963 first posting was to Jammu in No. 43 Sqn. (A Dakota operational Sqn). The main task was to operate to Kargil and Thoise to provide logistic support to the troops deployed in forward areas. I was fortunate to be deputed to be the base Cdr of AF clement at Kargil from Feb to May 1964, working along with 121 (Ind) infantry brigade was all education. Brig Cdr Brig Chopra (an armoured corps officer) always used to mention that Dras-Kargil Sector is the most sensitive sector because of its close proximity to the LOC and terrain factors. Being a transport pilot interactions with the Army remained a part of service life. I was once again with the Army’s most prestigious Institutions College of Combat “MHOW” (Now renamed Army War College). This was during 1980-81 to undergo the “Higher Command Course”. Fortunately Gen Sunderjee was the commandant. Who always believed in real time situations to be part of “sand model discussion”. Dras-Kargil sector was one such situation discussed during the course Not only that he had planned a similar offensive during 1987-88 during his tenure as the Army Chief. I was a privy to that plan along with Gen BC Nanda Army Cdr Northern Command, Air Marshal MM Singh AOC-in-C WAC and some other officers. The plan was conceived, articulated discussed at 15 corps HQ for weeks. The same was presented at Army HQ, however was not found feasible due to nearly whole of the IAF being deployed for the air defence. One has to visualize how senior commanders of the Army, could remain so insensitive to this sensitivity of Dras-Kargil Sector.
ARC’s role:-
Till mid 97 the user agencies could approach ARC only through RAW for their operational tasks. This used to delay the process by a week. Billy Bedis initiative made the functioning of ARC transparent and user friendly. The user agencies could send their indents for operational tasks directly to ARC, mission used to be launched the very next day. The prints and the analysis were delivered with in forty eight hours. During Kargil ops ARC Mi-17 were positioned at Srinagar and the prints and the PI analysis were delivered to the formation cdr’s directly- within forty eight to seventy two hours.
VCAS and AOC -in- C WAC and equivalent rank officers from other services were invited to ARC HQ for a presentation on ARC’s functioning, role and support to be provided. Most of the AF officers only attended the presentation. They were also taken to the other facilities with in Delhi Area. They were all invited to visit ARC bases and were offered to fly in ARC’s mission aircraft Gulf Stream and “B-707 (SASS aircraft)”. Only person who availed this opportunity was Air Marshal AY Tipnix (VCAS at that time) and some of his operational staff. He flew two missions in B-707 strategic air borne surveillance aircraft. He sent a letter to the Raw chief complimenting the operation, role and the effort. Some of the contents of that letter are quoted below.
I would like to convey my appreciation for providing me an opportunity to observe ARC’S Elint Operations on Board the Boeing-707. …………………………..
The missions, one along the IB/LAC with China and the other along the IB/LAC with Pakistan were well planned and executed……………My warmest compliments to both the crews-cockpit and technical. The ops manager has enthused a very positive work culture.
Future conflicts will require the IAF to proceed to high value targets, located deep within enemy territory, and penetrating hostile radar envelope of surveillance and weapon control systems. The survivability of our crew and aircraft will be very largely dependent upon our EQ efficiency; real time intelligence on the Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) of the adversary are central to mission planning and programming of warning receivers and jammers. In this task the ELINT……….My brief first hand experience has reinforced my confidence in our combined abilities and mutual trust.
Deployment of Air Power – The Kargil Commences
After Oct 1998 it was only on 07 May 1999 that DGMI from Army HQ had called up Billi Bedi (Director ARC) to provide Air Reccece Mission in Dras-Kargil sector. When the info was filtered down to the air operation it was surprising and astonishing to decipher that the area to be covered was our own territory. Immediately mission was planned and launched the next day. However we did not succeed due to inclement weather. First six days that is upto 13 May 99 inclement weather did not allow the success of our missions. By, this time ground situation was becoming explosive and the media was very active in projecting the scenario as a war like situation. Most the civilian pilots were reluctant to fly in the war like zone. Since I was fully qualified and operational on Gulf Stream type of aircraft fitted with MCRS ( Multi Camera Reconnaissance System), first three successful missions were flown by me personally. The PR mission flown on 18 May indicated 6 MI-17 helicopter of Pak Army parked in Mushok Valley area of our territory. These photographs were shown to the honourable RM he was aghast. This could not have happened with few weeks preparation this plan & preparation must have taken months of planning and preparation.
Even the Jaguar of the IAF were deployed in photo missions , but the results provided did not have the clarity, analysis and interpretation as compared to what could be provided by the ARC Gulf stream aircraft. Jaguar had limitation of height (not beyond 30,000 fit) endurance (45 to 60 minutes on task) and high vibration level restricted the clarity. The analysis and interpretation was by the personnel with limited experience. On the other hand ARC’s Gulf Stream aircraft operated at 45000 – 50000 feet, stable and silent platform (more than most of the Jet airliners) and an endurance of five and half hours. And the most important part of analysis and interpretation, ARC had experienced and dedicated PI’s on it strength, who were on the job for last 5 to 15 yrs or even more. Most of then were deputationist of the IAF & Army initially, however they had opted to be absorbed in ARC in that profession.
The missions launched by ARC were always discussed at Air HQ and such missions were under taken with full “Air Defence Cover” and air escort missions by Mirage 2000 or Mig 29 aircraft of the IAF.
The role of Air power remained restricted to “PR & Elint” missions only, till 25 may 1999. After deliberations at the highest level on 25 May it was decided to use the air power in an offensive role.
From the reports of the local Army commanders, the air attacks were effective and successful. On the same day, the IAF lost two fighter aircraft, a MiG-27 which went down after engine failure and MiG-21 which was shot down by a Pakistani surface –to-air missile (SAM) 9. The next day , on May 28,the IAF suffered another loss when a Mi-17 helicopter, while on an offensive mission in Drass sector was shot down by a man – portable Stinger SAM fired by the intruders. All 4 crew members, including the two pilots were killed.
During a final briefing to the press, the Air Force spokesman summing up the experience gained during the air operations in Kargil said that the air operations had taken place in an environment that was totally new in the history of world military aviation. The IAF had to unlearn what had been taught before as it was operating with a new set of paradigms such as ballistic trajectory of weapons in high altitude operations.
Air Marshal Vinod Patney ,Air Officer Commanding in-Chief Western Air Command, who conducted the air operations in Kargil, summarized the air effort as follows.31
1. Strike missions 550
2. Escort missions 500
3. Reconnaissance missions 150
4. Helicopter sorties for
Casuality evacuation and airlift. 2185
(d) The role of the intelligence agencies
Reference to Subramaniam Committee :-
A lot has been talked about Subramaniam Committee.
Sixteen meetings were held between the Subramaniam committee and ARC and RAW during the period of Aug 99 till Dec 2000.
I quote relevant portions "No intelligence failures had attributed on account of functioning of RAW and ARC. However, certain equipment inadequacies were highlighted such as :
(a) Satellite imagery resolution.
(b) All weather capability with sub metere resolution
(c) Availability of UAVs.
(d) Better coordination.
Some of the observations of Subramaniam Committee are relevant:-
However, it acknowledges that the Director, Intelligence Bureau (IB) did convey certain inputs on activities in areas under Gilgit-based FCNA (Force Commander Northern Areas) of Pakistan to the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the Cabinet Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Director-General Military Operations (DGMO).
There is a general lack of awareness of the critical importance of and the need for assessed intelligence at all levels. JIC reports do not receive the attention they deserve at the political and higher bureaucratic levels. Of the 45 intelligence inputs generated between May 1998 and April 1999, only 25 percent went through the JIC.
A Kargil-type situation could perhaps have been avoided had the Indian Army followed a policy of Siachenisation to plug unheld gaps along the 168 km stretch from Kaobal Gali to Chorbat La... Such a dispersal of forces to hold uninhabited territory of no strategic value would have dissipated considerable military strength and effort and would not have at all been cost effective. The alternative should be a credible declaratory policy of swiftly punishing wanton and willful violation of the sanctity of the LOC."
Specific to Kargil Operation:-
Army HQ asked for photographic intelligence of the LOC in Oct 98. After that no requisition was given by them. Requisition was given only on 07 May 99 to photograph our own territory. Numbers of missions were flown and I would like to place on record the comments of the CAS on the operations:
"I would like to place on record my sincere appreciation for the sterling work done by the ARC during Operation Vijay. The electronic and optical information provided by the ARC before and during the actual operations was of immense value to the conduct of air strikes.
The co-operation extended by your men in carrying out missions under difficult and demanding circumstances is an eloquent testimony to the excellent leadership and guidance provided by you to the organization.
I am confident that the co-ordination between our organizations achieved during the operation will continue in times to come."
Not only that there used to be nearly daily meetings between the DGMI or even with the CO AS.
I quote Gen VP Mallik the then CO AS.
"I highly appreciate the efforts of ARC in making our tasks easier. But you will appreciate I can not publicly acknowledge these contributions. As the Army has to show their commitment.
But I have no hesitation in admitting that it was your organizations, sterling effort that Army could link up and correlate their operational plans and execute them timely and successfully, otherwise the causality figures could have been much higher."
Even after my retirement whenever Gen Mallik met me always complimented the efforts of the ARC.
Conclusion
There is much evidence available to suggest the agencies concered with intelligence gathering, RAW and IB, had in fact provided their political masters and military commanders with ample warning about Pakistani intentions and activities. RAW went as far as telling the government that the Pakistanis were getting ready to launch a major operation in Kargil. It is also now evident that the three responsible political leaders, the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister and the Home Ministers, were all warned about what was brewing by their respective snoops. That they did not seem to act is indicative of their naivete, irresponsible attitude or sheer incompetence or they were absessed with the Bus Yatra and to its likely favourable fallout. The fact that two of the officials directly involved, the then RAW chief and the then Home secretary were rewarded with cushy post retirement position suggests that there might be quid-pro-quo for silence. Arvind Dave became the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh and B.P Singh was sent to the World Bank; their appointment became effective immediately on the day of their retirements. Not only that successor of Arvind Dave (who retired on 31st July, 1999) As Dulat (who was an OSD during Kargil operation) on his retirement as RAW Chief was inducted in the PMO as security advisor on Kashmir Affairs.
Lack of strategic intelligence could have been made up by the observation on the ground through scouts and petrol’s. Let us not forget that two shepherds observed the Pakistanis first and reported their presence to the forces. They had one pair of binoculars between them. Purposeful and planned patrolling would certainly have revealed the presence of 1500/2000 troops spread over an area of about 1400 square kilometers even if their ingress was not contemporaneously detected much earlier.The aggression across the LOC in Kargil clearly indicated a well planned military operation with a view to capture territory across the LOC, which would provide a springboard for further offensive operation inside Indain Kashmir. An operation of this magnitude could only be planned at the highest level in Pakistan with complete approval of the government.
We have to accept that our political leaders did not show enough foresight, they neglected, “National Interest” (of security) to gain political advantage. At the same time senior military leadership cannot escape the responsibilities of derelition of duty in safe guarding the “National Frontiers”. Those who should have been censured were awarded and decorated. We have to come out of that shell of a “holy cow” attitude.
India’s decision to limit the scope of operations in Kargil by not crossing the LOC despite suffering greater losses in the process was calculated not to enlarge the conflict or provide an excuse to Pakistan to seek UN intervention. The Army and the Air Force took this restriction in its stride and forged ahead .We saved the situation because of our highly professional, committed troops, Junior leaders (JCO’S) and officers who were fighting in the field. The commitment and sacrifice of those who perished is commendable and “Nation Salutes” them.
PVSM AVSM VM
11, Silver State, Pilibhit Byepass Road,
Bareilly-243005 (U.P.) INDIA
Tel:-0581-2526650,
Mob: 9411900090, 09999722636
Email-amashokgoel@gmail.com
“As I Saw it”
Kargil
Adventure for Pak
Blunder for India
Victory for those Who Perished
Kargil -99 caused the biggest flutter in the Indian subcontinent. This brought the two neighbors close to the nuclear holocaust inspite of the fact that we were far away from a full fledged declared war of the yester years (1965-1971).
A large number of books and reviews have been written by military leaders & civilian defence analyst. Not only that a high level committee was set up under the steward ship of the most experienced and renowned defence & security analyst of the country Mr. K Subramaniam. Most interestingly the two books which talk most eloquently – one by General VP Malik (Retd.) who was the Army Chief during the period of Kargil war and the other by Shri LK Advani who was Dy PM ( a defacto PM) and the Home Minister of the Govt. (NDA Govt. from April 98 to May 2004) are actually main actors of the Kargil making .
As the anniversary of the Kargil gets closer the main actors of the event become more vocal and anticulative in palming off the responsibility and shaking off their lapses. What prompted me to write this article was the news item in the “Hindustan Times” of 19 Jun 2008. “Lack of Visualization led to Kargil: - Gen Malik. In a foreword to book “Indian Army vision 2020” Gen Malik writes “ The Fact is that even after 60 years of independence, knowledge and experience of defence and military issues is lacking in most of our political leaders and civilian bureaucrats”. Though not sharing their own lapses and neglect of responsibilities.
Much has been written about the historical and military perspective of the Kashmir issue since independence. So I shall confine my self to Kargil as “I Saw it”, from the closest quarter.
The biggest players of this event were:-
(a) The Govt. the highest echelon of the Political Leadership.
(b) The top rug of the military leadership – The Army Chief, GOC-in-C Northern Command,15 Corps Cdr , and the 3 Div Cdr.
(c) The intelligence agencies primarily the IB & RAW.
(d) The role of Air Power.
(e) And the role played by the dedicated and committed soldiers and the junior level leaders. Who saved the situation of the fiasco created by our senior (Political & Military) leaders.
The Role of the Political leadership
May 1998 was the pinnacle of the NDA Govt. Having done the nuclear test in May and put India in the nuclear power list of the Nations , the biggest strategic achievement. Now the aim was to resolve the Kashmir issue for ever or create such a diplomatic environment that Kashmir issue should be freezed for ever. So that Vajpayee/Advani duo could go in the annals of the history. Political leadership was keen to encash the political gains of these two events. Hectic diplomatic activity had commenced. Vajpayee was overly keen to establish a political dialogue at the earliest with his counter part in Pakistan. This journey also was to be formalized in a dramatic manner to invite maximum media attention. Hectic activity commanced in Sep 1998. To the extent “PMO directed the RAW in Oct 98 (ARC who collects aerial intelligence”) to go slow on Pak. This kind of a directive was to send a message across the border that all our intentions are towards normalization of relations Vajpayee went to Lahore by “Bus” the famous “Bus Yatra” in Feb 99. It is a well known fact that Musharraf The Army Chief of the Pak did not show up with full respects to the visiting head of a neighboring country who was purely on a good will and a friendly mission. An indication enough for any leadership with foresight and insight to the astute feelings of an adventurous military leader like Musharraf.
May be this massage of Oct 98 “Go slow on Pak” would have trickled down to the Indian Army leadership as well, and made them complacent down the lime.
It is a well known fact that Srinagar Leh axis runs closest to the LOC in Dras –Kargil Sector. Not only that the terrain on the Indian side is hostile to defend, where as the terrain on Pakistan side is favorable to launch an offensive. Strategically Pakistan always intended to block/ disrupt or permanently dislocate the “Srinagar Leh Highway” in Dras Kargil Sector.
After being commissioned in the year 1963 first posting was to Jammu in No. 43 Sqn. (A Dakota operational Sqn). The main task was to operate to Kargil and Thoise to provide logistic support to the troops deployed in forward areas. I was fortunate to be deputed to be the base Cdr of AF clement at Kargil from Feb to May 1964, working along with 121 (Ind) infantry brigade was all education. Brig Cdr Brig Chopra (an armoured corps officer) always used to mention that Dras-Kargil Sector is the most sensitive sector because of its close proximity to the LOC and terrain factors. Being a transport pilot interactions with the Army remained a part of service life. I was once again with the Army’s most prestigious Institutions College of Combat “MHOW” (Now renamed Army War College). This was during 1980-81 to undergo the “Higher Command Course”. Fortunately Gen Sunderjee was the commandant. Who always believed in real time situations to be part of “sand model discussion”. Dras-Kargil sector was one such situation discussed during the course Not only that he had planned a similar offensive during 1987-88 during his tenure as the Army Chief. I was a privy to that plan along with Gen BC Nanda Army Cdr Northern Command, Air Marshal MM Singh AOC-in-C WAC and some other officers. The plan was conceived, articulated discussed at 15 corps HQ for weeks. The same was presented at Army HQ, however was not found feasible due to nearly whole of the IAF being deployed for the air defence. One has to visualize how senior commanders of the Army, could remain so insensitive to this sensitivity of Dras-Kargil Sector.
ARC’s role:-
Till mid 97 the user agencies could approach ARC only through RAW for their operational tasks. This used to delay the process by a week. Billy Bedis initiative made the functioning of ARC transparent and user friendly. The user agencies could send their indents for operational tasks directly to ARC, mission used to be launched the very next day. The prints and the analysis were delivered with in forty eight hours. During Kargil ops ARC Mi-17 were positioned at Srinagar and the prints and the PI analysis were delivered to the formation cdr’s directly- within forty eight to seventy two hours.
VCAS and AOC -in- C WAC and equivalent rank officers from other services were invited to ARC HQ for a presentation on ARC’s functioning, role and support to be provided. Most of the AF officers only attended the presentation. They were also taken to the other facilities with in Delhi Area. They were all invited to visit ARC bases and were offered to fly in ARC’s mission aircraft Gulf Stream and “B-707 (SASS aircraft)”. Only person who availed this opportunity was Air Marshal AY Tipnix (VCAS at that time) and some of his operational staff. He flew two missions in B-707 strategic air borne surveillance aircraft. He sent a letter to the Raw chief complimenting the operation, role and the effort. Some of the contents of that letter are quoted below.
I would like to convey my appreciation for providing me an opportunity to observe ARC’S Elint Operations on Board the Boeing-707. …………………………..
The missions, one along the IB/LAC with China and the other along the IB/LAC with Pakistan were well planned and executed……………My warmest compliments to both the crews-cockpit and technical. The ops manager has enthused a very positive work culture.
Future conflicts will require the IAF to proceed to high value targets, located deep within enemy territory, and penetrating hostile radar envelope of surveillance and weapon control systems. The survivability of our crew and aircraft will be very largely dependent upon our EQ efficiency; real time intelligence on the Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) of the adversary are central to mission planning and programming of warning receivers and jammers. In this task the ELINT……….My brief first hand experience has reinforced my confidence in our combined abilities and mutual trust.
Deployment of Air Power – The Kargil Commences
After Oct 1998 it was only on 07 May 1999 that DGMI from Army HQ had called up Billi Bedi (Director ARC) to provide Air Reccece Mission in Dras-Kargil sector. When the info was filtered down to the air operation it was surprising and astonishing to decipher that the area to be covered was our own territory. Immediately mission was planned and launched the next day. However we did not succeed due to inclement weather. First six days that is upto 13 May 99 inclement weather did not allow the success of our missions. By, this time ground situation was becoming explosive and the media was very active in projecting the scenario as a war like situation. Most the civilian pilots were reluctant to fly in the war like zone. Since I was fully qualified and operational on Gulf Stream type of aircraft fitted with MCRS ( Multi Camera Reconnaissance System), first three successful missions were flown by me personally. The PR mission flown on 18 May indicated 6 MI-17 helicopter of Pak Army parked in Mushok Valley area of our territory. These photographs were shown to the honourable RM he was aghast. This could not have happened with few weeks preparation this plan & preparation must have taken months of planning and preparation.
Even the Jaguar of the IAF were deployed in photo missions , but the results provided did not have the clarity, analysis and interpretation as compared to what could be provided by the ARC Gulf stream aircraft. Jaguar had limitation of height (not beyond 30,000 fit) endurance (45 to 60 minutes on task) and high vibration level restricted the clarity. The analysis and interpretation was by the personnel with limited experience. On the other hand ARC’s Gulf Stream aircraft operated at 45000 – 50000 feet, stable and silent platform (more than most of the Jet airliners) and an endurance of five and half hours. And the most important part of analysis and interpretation, ARC had experienced and dedicated PI’s on it strength, who were on the job for last 5 to 15 yrs or even more. Most of then were deputationist of the IAF & Army initially, however they had opted to be absorbed in ARC in that profession.
The missions launched by ARC were always discussed at Air HQ and such missions were under taken with full “Air Defence Cover” and air escort missions by Mirage 2000 or Mig 29 aircraft of the IAF.
The role of Air power remained restricted to “PR & Elint” missions only, till 25 may 1999. After deliberations at the highest level on 25 May it was decided to use the air power in an offensive role.
From the reports of the local Army commanders, the air attacks were effective and successful. On the same day, the IAF lost two fighter aircraft, a MiG-27 which went down after engine failure and MiG-21 which was shot down by a Pakistani surface –to-air missile (SAM) 9. The next day , on May 28,the IAF suffered another loss when a Mi-17 helicopter, while on an offensive mission in Drass sector was shot down by a man – portable Stinger SAM fired by the intruders. All 4 crew members, including the two pilots were killed.
During a final briefing to the press, the Air Force spokesman summing up the experience gained during the air operations in Kargil said that the air operations had taken place in an environment that was totally new in the history of world military aviation. The IAF had to unlearn what had been taught before as it was operating with a new set of paradigms such as ballistic trajectory of weapons in high altitude operations.
Air Marshal Vinod Patney ,Air Officer Commanding in-Chief Western Air Command, who conducted the air operations in Kargil, summarized the air effort as follows.31
1. Strike missions 550
2. Escort missions 500
3. Reconnaissance missions 150
4. Helicopter sorties for
Casuality evacuation and airlift. 2185
(d) The role of the intelligence agencies
Reference to Subramaniam Committee :-
A lot has been talked about Subramaniam Committee.
Sixteen meetings were held between the Subramaniam committee and ARC and RAW during the period of Aug 99 till Dec 2000.
I quote relevant portions "No intelligence failures had attributed on account of functioning of RAW and ARC. However, certain equipment inadequacies were highlighted such as :
(a) Satellite imagery resolution.
(b) All weather capability with sub metere resolution
(c) Availability of UAVs.
(d) Better coordination.
Some of the observations of Subramaniam Committee are relevant:-
However, it acknowledges that the Director, Intelligence Bureau (IB) did convey certain inputs on activities in areas under Gilgit-based FCNA (Force Commander Northern Areas) of Pakistan to the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the Cabinet Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Director-General Military Operations (DGMO).
There is a general lack of awareness of the critical importance of and the need for assessed intelligence at all levels. JIC reports do not receive the attention they deserve at the political and higher bureaucratic levels. Of the 45 intelligence inputs generated between May 1998 and April 1999, only 25 percent went through the JIC.
A Kargil-type situation could perhaps have been avoided had the Indian Army followed a policy of Siachenisation to plug unheld gaps along the 168 km stretch from Kaobal Gali to Chorbat La... Such a dispersal of forces to hold uninhabited territory of no strategic value would have dissipated considerable military strength and effort and would not have at all been cost effective. The alternative should be a credible declaratory policy of swiftly punishing wanton and willful violation of the sanctity of the LOC."
Specific to Kargil Operation:-
Army HQ asked for photographic intelligence of the LOC in Oct 98. After that no requisition was given by them. Requisition was given only on 07 May 99 to photograph our own territory. Numbers of missions were flown and I would like to place on record the comments of the CAS on the operations:
"I would like to place on record my sincere appreciation for the sterling work done by the ARC during Operation Vijay. The electronic and optical information provided by the ARC before and during the actual operations was of immense value to the conduct of air strikes.
The co-operation extended by your men in carrying out missions under difficult and demanding circumstances is an eloquent testimony to the excellent leadership and guidance provided by you to the organization.
I am confident that the co-ordination between our organizations achieved during the operation will continue in times to come."
Not only that there used to be nearly daily meetings between the DGMI or even with the CO AS.
I quote Gen VP Mallik the then CO AS.
"I highly appreciate the efforts of ARC in making our tasks easier. But you will appreciate I can not publicly acknowledge these contributions. As the Army has to show their commitment.
But I have no hesitation in admitting that it was your organizations, sterling effort that Army could link up and correlate their operational plans and execute them timely and successfully, otherwise the causality figures could have been much higher."
Even after my retirement whenever Gen Mallik met me always complimented the efforts of the ARC.
Conclusion
There is much evidence available to suggest the agencies concered with intelligence gathering, RAW and IB, had in fact provided their political masters and military commanders with ample warning about Pakistani intentions and activities. RAW went as far as telling the government that the Pakistanis were getting ready to launch a major operation in Kargil. It is also now evident that the three responsible political leaders, the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister and the Home Ministers, were all warned about what was brewing by their respective snoops. That they did not seem to act is indicative of their naivete, irresponsible attitude or sheer incompetence or they were absessed with the Bus Yatra and to its likely favourable fallout. The fact that two of the officials directly involved, the then RAW chief and the then Home secretary were rewarded with cushy post retirement position suggests that there might be quid-pro-quo for silence. Arvind Dave became the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh and B.P Singh was sent to the World Bank; their appointment became effective immediately on the day of their retirements. Not only that successor of Arvind Dave (who retired on 31st July, 1999) As Dulat (who was an OSD during Kargil operation) on his retirement as RAW Chief was inducted in the PMO as security advisor on Kashmir Affairs.
Lack of strategic intelligence could have been made up by the observation on the ground through scouts and petrol’s. Let us not forget that two shepherds observed the Pakistanis first and reported their presence to the forces. They had one pair of binoculars between them. Purposeful and planned patrolling would certainly have revealed the presence of 1500/2000 troops spread over an area of about 1400 square kilometers even if their ingress was not contemporaneously detected much earlier.The aggression across the LOC in Kargil clearly indicated a well planned military operation with a view to capture territory across the LOC, which would provide a springboard for further offensive operation inside Indain Kashmir. An operation of this magnitude could only be planned at the highest level in Pakistan with complete approval of the government.
We have to accept that our political leaders did not show enough foresight, they neglected, “National Interest” (of security) to gain political advantage. At the same time senior military leadership cannot escape the responsibilities of derelition of duty in safe guarding the “National Frontiers”. Those who should have been censured were awarded and decorated. We have to come out of that shell of a “holy cow” attitude.
India’s decision to limit the scope of operations in Kargil by not crossing the LOC despite suffering greater losses in the process was calculated not to enlarge the conflict or provide an excuse to Pakistan to seek UN intervention. The Army and the Air Force took this restriction in its stride and forged ahead .We saved the situation because of our highly professional, committed troops, Junior leaders (JCO’S) and officers who were fighting in the field. The commitment and sacrifice of those who perished is commendable and “Nation Salutes” them.
KASHMIR CALLING
Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd.)
PVSM AVSM VM
11, Silver State, Pilibhit Byepass Road,
Bareilly-243005 (U.P.) INDIA
Tel:-0581-2526650,
Mob: 9411900090, 09999722636
Email-amashokgoel@gmail.com
KASHMIR CALLING
The year gone by 2008 has been called a year of terror. Ten terror attacks last one on 26/11 the Mumbai massacre. The year was also significant for a mini general election (the so called semi final) held in six states. However the most important of them has been the election in the state of J & K and its follow-up. The state went into election against all possible odds, separatist call for the boycott of elections, the serious divide created due to Amarnath episode, and inclement weather due to onset of serious wintry conditions
The people of Jammu & Kashmir were determined to defeat them all. The most important election since 1957 when the first Assembly was voted. Highest voter turn out i.e. 60% and above, and no militant threats and no coercion to vote. The mandate remained fractured as expected. However the political maturity of the leaders at the state and national level has chosen the best coalition and ready to deliver under the young, dynamic and enthusiastic leadership of Omar Abdulla. At 38 years he represents the youngest leadership. Events of the state to emerge may change the political, social and security environment of the state and would have its fallout on National & Regional level as well.
Between 1963 to 2003 forty years in the IAF gave an ample opportunity to see every nook and corner of the state. No city, lakes, valleys, passes, airfields, dropping zones were spared to be visited and seen in absolute reality. Kashmir is heaven on earth, Kashmir is Switzerland of East, are not imagination but the realities. Valley or for that matter whole of J & K remained nearly peaceful. It was only after 8 Dec 1989, when Rubaiya Sayed daughter of Mufti Mohammed Sayed was kidnapped and as a surrender the unreasonable demands of the kidnappers were met with (by the VP Singh Govt.) within no time. That was the beginning of the Militancy in a big way in the state of J & K and particularly in the valley.
While in service one could normally have an official view of the ground realities. After retirement I had the opportunity to address “Civil Aviation Seminar” in Rajashthan, Uttrakhand, Haryana, MP, UP and Assam. Had the opportunity to address one such seminar at Srinagar (J & K) in the first week of Aug 2007. The seminar was organized by civilian businessmen who were setting up a civil aviation academy in the state. Till them nearly 20-25 seminar had been addressed all over the country from “Sriganganagar to Gauhati” The gathering at Srinagar ( as at other places) was mainly of young boys & Girls. The young crowd at Srinagar was the most well informed, appeared better educated, the knowledge of English was also far better. The standard of general knowledge and a desire to achieve was reflected in everyone, the boys and the Girls. The girls were beautiful, modest and confident. However most of them reflected an apprehension, how to get injected into the National main stream. While going around the town one could also see young girls handling varieties of jobs confidently in their traditional outfits.
The hosts took extraordinary care in extending the hospitality. I did ask the hosts how do they feel after nearly 60 years of independence. They replied nothing much has changed. “People feel alienated, politicians are corrupt, no job opportunities, the youth are rudderless and lack direction. One could feel the pain of the local people. Next day while traveling in a private taxi from Badamibagh to the Air port (nearly 20 Km distance) the taxi must have been stopped 20 times. It was my defence ROIC (Retired Officers Identity card) which saved the time. Otherwise the baggage would have been opened at every check point and frisking of all occupants (including the driver) would have been the most time consuming and embarrassing.
The events of J & K are directly linked to the happening of Pakistan. Pakistan is deeply wounded for the reasons:
Partition 1947
Annexation of majority states (Muslim) into Indian union, acquiring a minority status.
Defeat of Pakistani raiders in 47-48
India’s Pokhran – 1 - 1974
Dismemberment of Pakistan, 1971 war, creation of Bangladesh
Surrender of Pakistan Army with 93000 Pow’s on 16 Dec 1971
Surrender of Bhutto - Simla agreement 1972
Kargil war -1999, unconditional withdrawal of Pakistani “Terrorists”
2004-2008 Growing Indo US relations.
Indo/US Nuclear Deal
Pak in Turmoil due US/Pakistan alliance on “War on Terror”
Dear Omar Abdulla you have a great opportunity to change the history of the state of J & K, which would a have direct bearing on the National & Regional scene. The aspirations of the people are simple; the corruption free governance, job for the young, bring them into the National stream, and the last but slowly and steadily; the common people should not only feel Kashmiris, but Indians as well. Your success could be guiding factor and a role model for the right governance at the National Level.
PVSM AVSM VM
11, Silver State, Pilibhit Byepass Road,
Bareilly-243005 (U.P.) INDIA
Tel:-0581-2526650,
Mob: 9411900090, 09999722636
Email-amashokgoel@gmail.com
KASHMIR CALLING
The year gone by 2008 has been called a year of terror. Ten terror attacks last one on 26/11 the Mumbai massacre. The year was also significant for a mini general election (the so called semi final) held in six states. However the most important of them has been the election in the state of J & K and its follow-up. The state went into election against all possible odds, separatist call for the boycott of elections, the serious divide created due to Amarnath episode, and inclement weather due to onset of serious wintry conditions
The people of Jammu & Kashmir were determined to defeat them all. The most important election since 1957 when the first Assembly was voted. Highest voter turn out i.e. 60% and above, and no militant threats and no coercion to vote. The mandate remained fractured as expected. However the political maturity of the leaders at the state and national level has chosen the best coalition and ready to deliver under the young, dynamic and enthusiastic leadership of Omar Abdulla. At 38 years he represents the youngest leadership. Events of the state to emerge may change the political, social and security environment of the state and would have its fallout on National & Regional level as well.
Between 1963 to 2003 forty years in the IAF gave an ample opportunity to see every nook and corner of the state. No city, lakes, valleys, passes, airfields, dropping zones were spared to be visited and seen in absolute reality. Kashmir is heaven on earth, Kashmir is Switzerland of East, are not imagination but the realities. Valley or for that matter whole of J & K remained nearly peaceful. It was only after 8 Dec 1989, when Rubaiya Sayed daughter of Mufti Mohammed Sayed was kidnapped and as a surrender the unreasonable demands of the kidnappers were met with (by the VP Singh Govt.) within no time. That was the beginning of the Militancy in a big way in the state of J & K and particularly in the valley.
While in service one could normally have an official view of the ground realities. After retirement I had the opportunity to address “Civil Aviation Seminar” in Rajashthan, Uttrakhand, Haryana, MP, UP and Assam. Had the opportunity to address one such seminar at Srinagar (J & K) in the first week of Aug 2007. The seminar was organized by civilian businessmen who were setting up a civil aviation academy in the state. Till them nearly 20-25 seminar had been addressed all over the country from “Sriganganagar to Gauhati” The gathering at Srinagar ( as at other places) was mainly of young boys & Girls. The young crowd at Srinagar was the most well informed, appeared better educated, the knowledge of English was also far better. The standard of general knowledge and a desire to achieve was reflected in everyone, the boys and the Girls. The girls were beautiful, modest and confident. However most of them reflected an apprehension, how to get injected into the National main stream. While going around the town one could also see young girls handling varieties of jobs confidently in their traditional outfits.
The hosts took extraordinary care in extending the hospitality. I did ask the hosts how do they feel after nearly 60 years of independence. They replied nothing much has changed. “People feel alienated, politicians are corrupt, no job opportunities, the youth are rudderless and lack direction. One could feel the pain of the local people. Next day while traveling in a private taxi from Badamibagh to the Air port (nearly 20 Km distance) the taxi must have been stopped 20 times. It was my defence ROIC (Retired Officers Identity card) which saved the time. Otherwise the baggage would have been opened at every check point and frisking of all occupants (including the driver) would have been the most time consuming and embarrassing.
The events of J & K are directly linked to the happening of Pakistan. Pakistan is deeply wounded for the reasons:
Partition 1947
Annexation of majority states (Muslim) into Indian union, acquiring a minority status.
Defeat of Pakistani raiders in 47-48
India’s Pokhran – 1 - 1974
Dismemberment of Pakistan, 1971 war, creation of Bangladesh
Surrender of Pakistan Army with 93000 Pow’s on 16 Dec 1971
Surrender of Bhutto - Simla agreement 1972
Kargil war -1999, unconditional withdrawal of Pakistani “Terrorists”
2004-2008 Growing Indo US relations.
Indo/US Nuclear Deal
Pak in Turmoil due US/Pakistan alliance on “War on Terror”
Dear Omar Abdulla you have a great opportunity to change the history of the state of J & K, which would a have direct bearing on the National & Regional scene. The aspirations of the people are simple; the corruption free governance, job for the young, bring them into the National stream, and the last but slowly and steadily; the common people should not only feel Kashmiris, but Indians as well. Your success could be guiding factor and a role model for the right governance at the National Level.
Training to Fly-Option and System in the 21st Century
Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd.)
PVSM AVSM VM
11, Silver State, Pilibhit Byepass Road,
Bareilly-243005 (U.P.) INDIA
Tel:-0581-2526650,
Mob: 9411900090, 09999722636
Email-amashokgoel@gmail.com
Training to Fly-Option and System in the 21st Century
1. The well though out seminar (Better Late than Never) and timely.
2. The adage ‘The more we sweat in peace, the less we bleed in war’ is ever relevant today. And this sweat is ‘training’. Training plays a vital role in the life of any aviator, more so of a combat flier. Only the best trained emerge to take their place in front line fighter squadrons in defence of the country. These consummately trained pilots are the human mainstay of air power of the country. Associated costs must be well managed, with a rational balance between simulator time and actual flying training.
3. Concern for aircraft accidents needs no emphasis. Various studies in the IAF have revealed nearly 45% accidents are due to Human Error Aircrew (HE (A)) and 45% accidents occur due to Technical Defects (TD).
4. Another revelation of (TD) Technical Defect Accidents is that majority of technical defect accidents in fighters, hepters and trainer fleet are only on those aircraft (90%) which are serviced or produced under license or are produced indigenously by HAL –(Mig-21, Mig-27, Jaguar, Chetak, Cheeta helicopters and Kiran and HPT-32 trainers) the reason for these high rates of technical defect accidents have been highlighted in various forums or inquires.
5. The story of HPT-32 has been a victim of this public sector lethargy in a monopolistic industry. HPT-32 was supposed to be an improved version of old HT-(2) (produced in late 50% early 60’s). HPT-32 (produced in early 1985) has had its inherent problem of engine oil system. The maneuvers required a fool proof engine. Rather than improving the engine IAF decided to eliminate some of the maneuvers (hammer stall/inverted flying etc) to ensure better engine reliability. Even that has failed.
6. HPT-32 is a “Basic flying Trainer”. Where in a pilots confidence level in this profession has to be built. A machine not technically sound does break the basic requirement of confidence building into a nighmare and fear. At the training stage we need, “Reliability, Versatility, Maneuverability, Quality and high Confidence level of the operations. All appearing to be shattering. HAL does not have any accountability to offer. We have to shed this “Captive customer “policy of the Government and look elsewhere. Time has come to look for a “Turboprop” basic trainer elsewhere to restore the confidence of the user till HAL comes out well in all spheres of “Reliability, Versatility Maneuverability and Quality to restore the confidence of the user.
7. Considering the IAF is to induct some 600 + new generation combat aircraft in the next 10-15 years, the flying training platforms need to be of contemporary technology, with glass cockpits, simulated sensors etc. so as to prepare fledgling pilots most cost-effectively for operational flying of advanced combat aircraft.
8. We need to establish world class training facilities like the one at Flight Safety International. “Pan Am Academy” in USA.
9. Simulators provide solid foundation to a pilot to attain high professional standards.
Firstly- to fly the aircraft to its ultimate limits thus develop a total confidence in the machine.
Secondly- when a budding pilot is able to handle the aircraft (on simulators) to its ultimate limits builds his own confidence level to utmost capacity.
10. The training has to develop in the three stages:
(a) Simulators
(b) Basic Trainer ( A turbo )
(c) Intermediate Jet Trainer
Either HAL is to provide or we should explore International market. Def Expo 2010 gave enough of exposure. “South Korea”, “Germany”, Italy and Spain have adequacy in the field. We should set the target beginning of 2013 have all this.
May be the older generation of the IAF did not appreciate this well enough the new generation of commanders must change and accept this new environment.
Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd)
PVSM AVSM VM
Mobile:09411900090
amashokgoel@gmail.com
Ms. Ritika Sabharwal
ritikasabharwal@gmail.com
Tel.:09999-082-782
PVSM AVSM VM
11, Silver State, Pilibhit Byepass Road,
Bareilly-243005 (U.P.) INDIA
Tel:-0581-2526650,
Mob: 9411900090, 09999722636
Email-amashokgoel@gmail.com
Training to Fly-Option and System in the 21st Century
1. The well though out seminar (Better Late than Never) and timely.
2. The adage ‘The more we sweat in peace, the less we bleed in war’ is ever relevant today. And this sweat is ‘training’. Training plays a vital role in the life of any aviator, more so of a combat flier. Only the best trained emerge to take their place in front line fighter squadrons in defence of the country. These consummately trained pilots are the human mainstay of air power of the country. Associated costs must be well managed, with a rational balance between simulator time and actual flying training.
3. Concern for aircraft accidents needs no emphasis. Various studies in the IAF have revealed nearly 45% accidents are due to Human Error Aircrew (HE (A)) and 45% accidents occur due to Technical Defects (TD).
4. Another revelation of (TD) Technical Defect Accidents is that majority of technical defect accidents in fighters, hepters and trainer fleet are only on those aircraft (90%) which are serviced or produced under license or are produced indigenously by HAL –(Mig-21, Mig-27, Jaguar, Chetak, Cheeta helicopters and Kiran and HPT-32 trainers) the reason for these high rates of technical defect accidents have been highlighted in various forums or inquires.
5. The story of HPT-32 has been a victim of this public sector lethargy in a monopolistic industry. HPT-32 was supposed to be an improved version of old HT-(2) (produced in late 50% early 60’s). HPT-32 (produced in early 1985) has had its inherent problem of engine oil system. The maneuvers required a fool proof engine. Rather than improving the engine IAF decided to eliminate some of the maneuvers (hammer stall/inverted flying etc) to ensure better engine reliability. Even that has failed.
6. HPT-32 is a “Basic flying Trainer”. Where in a pilots confidence level in this profession has to be built. A machine not technically sound does break the basic requirement of confidence building into a nighmare and fear. At the training stage we need, “Reliability, Versatility, Maneuverability, Quality and high Confidence level of the operations. All appearing to be shattering. HAL does not have any accountability to offer. We have to shed this “Captive customer “policy of the Government and look elsewhere. Time has come to look for a “Turboprop” basic trainer elsewhere to restore the confidence of the user till HAL comes out well in all spheres of “Reliability, Versatility Maneuverability and Quality to restore the confidence of the user.
7. Considering the IAF is to induct some 600 + new generation combat aircraft in the next 10-15 years, the flying training platforms need to be of contemporary technology, with glass cockpits, simulated sensors etc. so as to prepare fledgling pilots most cost-effectively for operational flying of advanced combat aircraft.
8. We need to establish world class training facilities like the one at Flight Safety International. “Pan Am Academy” in USA.
9. Simulators provide solid foundation to a pilot to attain high professional standards.
Firstly- to fly the aircraft to its ultimate limits thus develop a total confidence in the machine.
Secondly- when a budding pilot is able to handle the aircraft (on simulators) to its ultimate limits builds his own confidence level to utmost capacity.
10. The training has to develop in the three stages:
(a) Simulators
(b) Basic Trainer ( A turbo )
(c) Intermediate Jet Trainer
Either HAL is to provide or we should explore International market. Def Expo 2010 gave enough of exposure. “South Korea”, “Germany”, Italy and Spain have adequacy in the field. We should set the target beginning of 2013 have all this.
May be the older generation of the IAF did not appreciate this well enough the new generation of commanders must change and accept this new environment.
Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd)
PVSM AVSM VM
Mobile:09411900090
amashokgoel@gmail.com
Ms. Ritika Sabharwal
ritikasabharwal@gmail.com
Tel.:09999-082-782
Acquisition of Advanced Combat Helicopters
Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd.)
PVSM AVSM VM
11, Silver State, Pilibhit Byepass Road,
Bareilly-243005 (U.P.) INDIA
Tel:-0581-2526650,
Mob: 9411900090, 09999722636
Email-amashokgoel@gmail.com
Acquisition of Advanced Combat Helicopters
ü So far Air Force has depended on soviet built M1-35 helicopters
ü Acquired more than 25 years back do need a replacement with more modern & advanced machines.
ü Basically an offensive weapon system.
ü The command & control of these units has always been a bone of contention between Army & and the Air Force.
ü The maintenance and upkeep is the responsibility of the Indian Air Force.
ü In the beginning all aircrews were from the Air Force.
ü Now there is a mix of Air Force and Army Pilots.
ü The existing machines have a operational limitation upto a height of 10000’ (i.e. upto 3.3 km.)
ü That is why their usage in Kargil war was nearly nil.
ü Basically the weapon system is to be a part of a strike corps. To provide safe passage for moving combat columns.
ü But in our context we may need then in J & K and Siachen Glacier also.
ü The performance at highest altitudes say between 15000 to 20000’ (i.e. 4.5 to 6.5 km) height a.m.sl. could be a big deciding factor.
ü We need to test them in the deserts of Rajasthan and the hills of J & K.
PVSM AVSM VM
11, Silver State, Pilibhit Byepass Road,
Bareilly-243005 (U.P.) INDIA
Tel:-0581-2526650,
Mob: 9411900090, 09999722636
Email-amashokgoel@gmail.com
Acquisition of Advanced Combat Helicopters
ü So far Air Force has depended on soviet built M1-35 helicopters
ü Acquired more than 25 years back do need a replacement with more modern & advanced machines.
ü Basically an offensive weapon system.
ü The command & control of these units has always been a bone of contention between Army & and the Air Force.
ü The maintenance and upkeep is the responsibility of the Indian Air Force.
ü In the beginning all aircrews were from the Air Force.
ü Now there is a mix of Air Force and Army Pilots.
ü The existing machines have a operational limitation upto a height of 10000’ (i.e. upto 3.3 km.)
ü That is why their usage in Kargil war was nearly nil.
ü Basically the weapon system is to be a part of a strike corps. To provide safe passage for moving combat columns.
ü But in our context we may need then in J & K and Siachen Glacier also.
ü The performance at highest altitudes say between 15000 to 20000’ (i.e. 4.5 to 6.5 km) height a.m.sl. could be a big deciding factor.
ü We need to test them in the deserts of Rajasthan and the hills of J & K.
Transport Fleet and its Relevance to the IAF
Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd.)
PVSM AVSM VM
11, Silver State, Pilibhit Byepass Road,
Bareilly-243005 (U.P.) INDIA
Tel:-0581-2526650,
Mob: 9411900090, 09999722636
Email-amashokgoel@gmail.com
Transport Fleet and its Relevance to the IAF
The Indian Air Force was officially established on 08 October 1932, being the date of its formal constitution. The first aircraft flight however was not formed until 01 April 1933, at which time it possessed a strength of six officers trained at RAF cranwell and 19 “Hawai Sepoys” (literally air soldier), its aircraft inventory comprised four westland wapiti II A.
The year 1946 also saw the establishment of the first RIAF transport unit, No. 12 squadron (first as sprit fire squadron in 1945) and received Dakota’s in Panagarh in late 1946.In Jan 1950 India became a Republic and the IAF dropped its prefix “Royal”.
At this time India possessed six fighter squadron, one bomber and one C-47 Dakota transport squadron. In addition had one AOP flight, a communication squadron and training organization.
A second transport squadron No. 11 had been formed on C-47 Dakota’s in Sep 1951. Eighty C-119G packet aircraft were inducted during the period 1954 to early 1963 under US emergency military aid. Packet aircraft propeller driven piston engine aircraft which served the IAF till Jul 1985 for more than 30 yrs. A most beautifully crafted military transport aircraft of its time. The cockpit, the delivery system, loading facilities were immaculate and was air crews delight, specially for the pilots. An aircraft totally unpressurized not designed to fly beyond 18000 feet. It was recharged with additional jet engine (J-34) to operate up to 24000 feet. This magnificent machine operated regularly to Leh, Thoise, Kargil and Fukche. All airfields were beyond 3200 meters (11000 feet) elevation. Not only, that the aircraft created history by landing at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) an airstrip located beyond 16000 feet elevation.
Sixties revealed a serious security concern for India. Frequent clashes with china and finally an unprovoked attack on India’s sovereignty in October 1962 necessitated quick and timely builtup of the Air Force. Transport aircraft and logistics became a hall mark. Soviet built An-12 and IL-14 were inducted during the period March 1961 to July 1963. Two new operational squadrons were formed namely No. 44 and 25 squadron at Chandigarh.
An-12 aircraft also had its limitations. The aircraft was partially pressurized (only the crew cabin & the Kabina with 14 passenger capacity). In spite of its limitation of Navigational aids, the aircraft played a remarkable role in Air Transport, Air maintenance and Maritime reconnaissance roles.
The most remarkable achievement of the An -12 fleet (No 44 Squadron) was modification in “Bombing Role” just prior to the 1971 conflict. It can be said unhesitatingly that the An – 12 aircraft in its intense usage in ‘Bombing Role’ in the “western” as well as in the “Eastern” sector turned the fate of the war in India’s favor. Even the Russians were amazed to know this role of the An-12 aircraft .Finally this magnificent and magestic machine went our of Indian skies during Jul 1993.
IAF’s peacetime role has been “Air Maintenance” of its troops in the western sector and maintaining troops and civilians population in the Eastern sector in a big way. This requirement by itself necessitated deployment of 4 squadrons in the western sector and nearly four squadrons in the Eastern sector. The Dakota and the packet fleet which were the back bones of the transport fleet had out lived their technical life and maintenance support was, becoming a nightmare. Since mid seventies, the fleet had shown signs of dwindling force and was lying in pains.
We delayed in identification and induction of replacements by seven years (since mid seventies). By this time An – 12 fleet was also showing signs of fatigue and in adequate maintenance support.
It was only during early eighties that a final decisions was taken to completely replace the ageing Dakota & Packet fleet with An – 32 aircraft. Soviets had offered modified An – 26 with high powered engines for high attitude operations. It would be interesting to know that 118 An – 32 aircraft were contracted on a 20 years military credit arrangement, with no interest liability. Literally one aircraft cost was just Rs. 1 crore (USD 200,000 thousand at the present rate of exchange).
I still remember the words of then JS (Air) Mr Desai in a meeting, when he said “sign as many aircraft you want, after few years even a car may cost more than that”. Interestingly today just one aircraft of its class would cost double of the cost of 118 aircraft paid at that time.
By this time replacement of An – 12 was also thought out IL – 76 MD was found to be the most suitable aircraft. An aircraft with 48 tones pay load capacity. Four engines multipurpose aircraft capable of operating at unpaved surface. An aircraft which can operate without any ground support system most reliably. Most suitable for quick induction of troops in battle zones or disturbed area. A full complement of 225 troops can be landed and deployed in a matter of three minutes with no hassles.
The induction of An – 32 during the early 1984 and IL-76 MD aircraft during 1985 added a new dimension to the Indian subcontinent. Besides their taking over the control of Air maintenance role and Air transport operation within 3-6 months of their induction gave a tremendous boost to the Air Force and the Nation as a whole. IL-76 MD landed at Leh during Oct 85 even landed at Thoise when airfield was only 1700 meters long during Jan 1987.
The first testing ground for India’s new resurgence in strategic reach was evident in Srilanka operation. First during Jun 1987 when 6 An-32 aircraft carried out food supply drops to display their solidarity for the suffering of Tamils in Jaffan peninsula. On 29 Jul 1987, once Srilanka accord was signed by our PM (late Shri Rajeev Gandhi) from 30 Jul 87 onwards massive induction of IPKF commenced and lasted till March 1990. The IAF’s transport fleet provided unhindered massive support during the operation.
In spite of the fact that IPKF operation were going on another major call came from our neighbors, Maldives on 3 Nov 88. It was for the strategic reach of the IAF that 5 IL-76 aircraft and 30 An – 32’s were pressed into service within few hours of the SOS from President Gayoom and his Govt. And the Govt. was saved.
Since the time we last inducted the transport aircraft was 25 years back. Both An – 32 and IL – 76 MD aircraft have completed their calendar life as per Soviet specification. Both are on their extended life may be another 10-15 yrs or a maximum of 20 yrs. It is time to put on our thinking caps to look for replacements.
Most ideally we should have developed our own METAC (7-10 tons) capacity aircraft. A thinking seem to have gone about developing MTA (Multi role Transport Aircraft) in a joint venture with the Soviets we should certainly go ahead.
Presently induction of 6 C – 130 aircraft at a cost of Rs. 1000 crore appears to be a viable proposal. But other avenues first indigenization, secondly C-295 (Spanish) and M – 400 A (EADS) are other options, which should be explored.
In heavy lift capability IL-76 MD aircraft with 48 tones (could carry T – 72 tank weight 42 tones) has served well. May be IAF would need to look for an aircraft with 70 tons pay load capacity for our long reach and futuristic engagements.
We have to keep with the pace of the time and timely identification and induction of replacements.
Delayed induction of METAC costed us very heavily during the period 1984-1993. In a period of 9 yrs we lost 13 An-32 aircraft in Cat –I accidents. Be wiser and don’t let that experience be repeated.
PVSM AVSM VM
11, Silver State, Pilibhit Byepass Road,
Bareilly-243005 (U.P.) INDIA
Tel:-0581-2526650,
Mob: 9411900090, 09999722636
Email-amashokgoel@gmail.com
Transport Fleet and its Relevance to the IAF
The Indian Air Force was officially established on 08 October 1932, being the date of its formal constitution. The first aircraft flight however was not formed until 01 April 1933, at which time it possessed a strength of six officers trained at RAF cranwell and 19 “Hawai Sepoys” (literally air soldier), its aircraft inventory comprised four westland wapiti II A.
The year 1946 also saw the establishment of the first RIAF transport unit, No. 12 squadron (first as sprit fire squadron in 1945) and received Dakota’s in Panagarh in late 1946.In Jan 1950 India became a Republic and the IAF dropped its prefix “Royal”.
At this time India possessed six fighter squadron, one bomber and one C-47 Dakota transport squadron. In addition had one AOP flight, a communication squadron and training organization.
A second transport squadron No. 11 had been formed on C-47 Dakota’s in Sep 1951. Eighty C-119G packet aircraft were inducted during the period 1954 to early 1963 under US emergency military aid. Packet aircraft propeller driven piston engine aircraft which served the IAF till Jul 1985 for more than 30 yrs. A most beautifully crafted military transport aircraft of its time. The cockpit, the delivery system, loading facilities were immaculate and was air crews delight, specially for the pilots. An aircraft totally unpressurized not designed to fly beyond 18000 feet. It was recharged with additional jet engine (J-34) to operate up to 24000 feet. This magnificent machine operated regularly to Leh, Thoise, Kargil and Fukche. All airfields were beyond 3200 meters (11000 feet) elevation. Not only, that the aircraft created history by landing at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) an airstrip located beyond 16000 feet elevation.
Sixties revealed a serious security concern for India. Frequent clashes with china and finally an unprovoked attack on India’s sovereignty in October 1962 necessitated quick and timely builtup of the Air Force. Transport aircraft and logistics became a hall mark. Soviet built An-12 and IL-14 were inducted during the period March 1961 to July 1963. Two new operational squadrons were formed namely No. 44 and 25 squadron at Chandigarh.
An-12 aircraft also had its limitations. The aircraft was partially pressurized (only the crew cabin & the Kabina with 14 passenger capacity). In spite of its limitation of Navigational aids, the aircraft played a remarkable role in Air Transport, Air maintenance and Maritime reconnaissance roles.
The most remarkable achievement of the An -12 fleet (No 44 Squadron) was modification in “Bombing Role” just prior to the 1971 conflict. It can be said unhesitatingly that the An – 12 aircraft in its intense usage in ‘Bombing Role’ in the “western” as well as in the “Eastern” sector turned the fate of the war in India’s favor. Even the Russians were amazed to know this role of the An-12 aircraft .Finally this magnificent and magestic machine went our of Indian skies during Jul 1993.
IAF’s peacetime role has been “Air Maintenance” of its troops in the western sector and maintaining troops and civilians population in the Eastern sector in a big way. This requirement by itself necessitated deployment of 4 squadrons in the western sector and nearly four squadrons in the Eastern sector. The Dakota and the packet fleet which were the back bones of the transport fleet had out lived their technical life and maintenance support was, becoming a nightmare. Since mid seventies, the fleet had shown signs of dwindling force and was lying in pains.
We delayed in identification and induction of replacements by seven years (since mid seventies). By this time An – 12 fleet was also showing signs of fatigue and in adequate maintenance support.
It was only during early eighties that a final decisions was taken to completely replace the ageing Dakota & Packet fleet with An – 32 aircraft. Soviets had offered modified An – 26 with high powered engines for high attitude operations. It would be interesting to know that 118 An – 32 aircraft were contracted on a 20 years military credit arrangement, with no interest liability. Literally one aircraft cost was just Rs. 1 crore (USD 200,000 thousand at the present rate of exchange).
I still remember the words of then JS (Air) Mr Desai in a meeting, when he said “sign as many aircraft you want, after few years even a car may cost more than that”. Interestingly today just one aircraft of its class would cost double of the cost of 118 aircraft paid at that time.
By this time replacement of An – 12 was also thought out IL – 76 MD was found to be the most suitable aircraft. An aircraft with 48 tones pay load capacity. Four engines multipurpose aircraft capable of operating at unpaved surface. An aircraft which can operate without any ground support system most reliably. Most suitable for quick induction of troops in battle zones or disturbed area. A full complement of 225 troops can be landed and deployed in a matter of three minutes with no hassles.
The induction of An – 32 during the early 1984 and IL-76 MD aircraft during 1985 added a new dimension to the Indian subcontinent. Besides their taking over the control of Air maintenance role and Air transport operation within 3-6 months of their induction gave a tremendous boost to the Air Force and the Nation as a whole. IL-76 MD landed at Leh during Oct 85 even landed at Thoise when airfield was only 1700 meters long during Jan 1987.
The first testing ground for India’s new resurgence in strategic reach was evident in Srilanka operation. First during Jun 1987 when 6 An-32 aircraft carried out food supply drops to display their solidarity for the suffering of Tamils in Jaffan peninsula. On 29 Jul 1987, once Srilanka accord was signed by our PM (late Shri Rajeev Gandhi) from 30 Jul 87 onwards massive induction of IPKF commenced and lasted till March 1990. The IAF’s transport fleet provided unhindered massive support during the operation.
In spite of the fact that IPKF operation were going on another major call came from our neighbors, Maldives on 3 Nov 88. It was for the strategic reach of the IAF that 5 IL-76 aircraft and 30 An – 32’s were pressed into service within few hours of the SOS from President Gayoom and his Govt. And the Govt. was saved.
Since the time we last inducted the transport aircraft was 25 years back. Both An – 32 and IL – 76 MD aircraft have completed their calendar life as per Soviet specification. Both are on their extended life may be another 10-15 yrs or a maximum of 20 yrs. It is time to put on our thinking caps to look for replacements.
Most ideally we should have developed our own METAC (7-10 tons) capacity aircraft. A thinking seem to have gone about developing MTA (Multi role Transport Aircraft) in a joint venture with the Soviets we should certainly go ahead.
Presently induction of 6 C – 130 aircraft at a cost of Rs. 1000 crore appears to be a viable proposal. But other avenues first indigenization, secondly C-295 (Spanish) and M – 400 A (EADS) are other options, which should be explored.
In heavy lift capability IL-76 MD aircraft with 48 tones (could carry T – 72 tank weight 42 tones) has served well. May be IAF would need to look for an aircraft with 70 tons pay load capacity for our long reach and futuristic engagements.
We have to keep with the pace of the time and timely identification and induction of replacements.
Delayed induction of METAC costed us very heavily during the period 1984-1993. In a period of 9 yrs we lost 13 An-32 aircraft in Cat –I accidents. Be wiser and don’t let that experience be repeated.
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