Dear Friends
Press release regarding “One Rank One Pension” dated 10 June 2009 has already fwd to all Press is circulated herewith for your info please.
With Kind Regards,
Jai Hind
Yours Sincerely,
Maj Gen (Retd) Satbir Singh, SM
Vice Chairman Indian ESM Movement
Mobile: 9312404269, 0124-4110570
Email :
satbirsm@yahoo.com
PRESS RELEASE
Dated: 10 June 2009
ONE RANK ONE PENSION
Dear Members of the Media,
1. In her address to both houses of Parliament, the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces Mrs. Pratibha Patil on 04 June 2009 announced that long pending demand of One Rank One Pension (OROP) of the Defence Forces will be reexamined and decision arrived at by 30 June 2009. The announcement has been widely welcomed by the Defence personnel specially the Ex-Servicemen who have been agitating for the past one year to press for their demands specially the One Rank One Pension. Deeply hurt and anguished at the apathy shown by the Govt in not accepting their main demand of OROP, they on four occasions deposited over 15000 gallantry and distinguished service medals with the President.
2. The Indian Ex-servicemen Movement (IESM,) an umbrella organization for all Ex Servicemen of India appeals to the Govt that the committee headed by Mr Chandrasekhar must not dilute the Definition of OROP ie irrespective of the date of retirement, the Defence Personnel who have rendered same years of service and holding same rank must get same pension. Only the grant of Full Parity with the new pensioners will meet the ends of justice.
3. We appeal to the Govt to accept the concept of One Rank One Pension with full Parity and make it the policy for grant of pensions to the Defence Personnel. Any other thoughts/proposal of One Time increase/modified parity/near parity will not be in line with the “Just and Fair” solution to the emotive issue of OROP. We are hopeful that the Govt will give due consideration to this important aspect of Defence Forces.
With regards,
Jai Hind
Yours Sincerely,
Maj Gen (Retd) Satbir Singh, SM
Vice Chairman Indian ESM Movement
Mobile: 9312404269, 0124-4110570
Email: satbirsm@yahoo.com
Monday, June 15, 2009
IAF chooses C 17 Globemaster III
Gulshan Luthra Gulshan.Luthra@indiastrategic.in and Air Marshal Ashok Goel amashokgoel@gmail.com
IAF chooses C 17 Globemaster III
New Delhi. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has shortlisted the Boeing C 17 Globemaster III as its new Very Heavy Lift Transport Aircraft (VHTAC).
Chief of Air Staff air Chief Marshal P V Naik told India Strategic that the aircraft had been chosen after a thorough study because of its capability to take off and land on short runways with heavy loads, long range, and ease of operation.
IAF was looking at acquiring 10 C 17s initially through the US government’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route, and that a proposal in this regard was being considered by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), he said adding that the aircraft should come in about three years after a contract is signed.
At present, India has less than 20 IL 76 Soviet-era aircraft for strategic lift, but they were acquired two decades ago. The requirement today is for technologically better, easier to maintain, and a larger number of aircraft due to the strategic scenario around India and the need to ferry troops, men and material even within India in times of contingency.
An IL 76 can carry a cargo of around 40 tonnes while a C 17 can carry 70 tonnes, and is much easier to operate with a small crew of two pilots and one loadmaster (total three) only despite its massive size, thanks to its various power-assisted systems. Two observers though can also be seated.
Despite its massive size – 174 ft length, 55 ft height and about 170 ft wingspan – a pilot can fly the aircraft with a simple joystick, much like a fighter aircraft, which can be lifesaving in a battlezone as the aircraft can take off quickly and at steep angles. It is powered by four Pratt & Whitney F-117-PW-100 turbofan engines.
The C 17 is the mainstay of US forces for worldwide deployment, and can be refueled midair. It is in fact the lifeline of US and NATO troops deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Boeing has brought the aircraft several times to India for its literal catwalk on IAF tarmacs, including at the Aero India 2007 and 2009 in Bangalore. Indian military officials and journalists have been invited for the aircraft’s flight displays during the Paris Air Show beginning June 15.
According to the Boeing company, the high-wing, 4-engine, multi-service T-tailed military-transport C-17 can carry large equipment including two tanks, supplies and troops directly to small airfields in harsh terrain anywhere in the world day or night.
The massive, sturdy, long-haul aircraft tackles distance, destination and heavy, oversized payloads in unpredictable conditions. It has delivered cargo in every worldwide operation since the 1990s. It can take off from a 7,600-ft airfield, carry a payload of 160,000 pounds, fly 2,400 nautical miles, refuel while in flight for longer range, and land in 3,000 ft or less on a small unpaved or paved airfield day or night.
The aircraft can also be used as an aerial ambulance.
The cost of the aircraft is not available but according to published reports, it was $237 million in 2007.
IAF chooses C 17 Globemaster III
New Delhi. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has shortlisted the Boeing C 17 Globemaster III as its new Very Heavy Lift Transport Aircraft (VHTAC).
Chief of Air Staff air Chief Marshal P V Naik told India Strategic that the aircraft had been chosen after a thorough study because of its capability to take off and land on short runways with heavy loads, long range, and ease of operation.
IAF was looking at acquiring 10 C 17s initially through the US government’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route, and that a proposal in this regard was being considered by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), he said adding that the aircraft should come in about three years after a contract is signed.
At present, India has less than 20 IL 76 Soviet-era aircraft for strategic lift, but they were acquired two decades ago. The requirement today is for technologically better, easier to maintain, and a larger number of aircraft due to the strategic scenario around India and the need to ferry troops, men and material even within India in times of contingency.
An IL 76 can carry a cargo of around 40 tonnes while a C 17 can carry 70 tonnes, and is much easier to operate with a small crew of two pilots and one loadmaster (total three) only despite its massive size, thanks to its various power-assisted systems. Two observers though can also be seated.
Despite its massive size – 174 ft length, 55 ft height and about 170 ft wingspan – a pilot can fly the aircraft with a simple joystick, much like a fighter aircraft, which can be lifesaving in a battlezone as the aircraft can take off quickly and at steep angles. It is powered by four Pratt & Whitney F-117-PW-100 turbofan engines.
The C 17 is the mainstay of US forces for worldwide deployment, and can be refueled midair. It is in fact the lifeline of US and NATO troops deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Boeing has brought the aircraft several times to India for its literal catwalk on IAF tarmacs, including at the Aero India 2007 and 2009 in Bangalore. Indian military officials and journalists have been invited for the aircraft’s flight displays during the Paris Air Show beginning June 15.
According to the Boeing company, the high-wing, 4-engine, multi-service T-tailed military-transport C-17 can carry large equipment including two tanks, supplies and troops directly to small airfields in harsh terrain anywhere in the world day or night.
The massive, sturdy, long-haul aircraft tackles distance, destination and heavy, oversized payloads in unpredictable conditions. It has delivered cargo in every worldwide operation since the 1990s. It can take off from a 7,600-ft airfield, carry a payload of 160,000 pounds, fly 2,400 nautical miles, refuel while in flight for longer range, and land in 3,000 ft or less on a small unpaved or paved airfield day or night.
The aircraft can also be used as an aerial ambulance.
The cost of the aircraft is not available but according to published reports, it was $237 million in 2007.
Monday, May 4, 2009
Special Olympics Bharat
What is Special Olympics?
Special Olympics is an international Movement dedicated to empowering people with intellectual disabilities to become physically fit, productive and respected members of society, though sports training and athletic competition. The Movement involves:
• 2.5 million Athletes, with a goal of 4 million by 2009
• More than 200 Special Olympics programs in 170 countries
• 26 Olympic-type summer and winter sports
• 7 regional offices around the world, including Belgium, Egypt, Zimbabwe, India, China, Panama, and USA
• Approximately 750,000 volunteers
• More than 2, 00,000 coaches
• More than 20,000 competitions around the world each year
Special Olympics Mission
· To provide year-round sports training and athletic competition in a variety of Olympic-type sports for children and adults with intellectual disabilities, giving them continuing opportunities to develop physical fitness, demonstrate courage, experience joy and participate in a sharing of gifts, skills and friendship with their families, other Special Olympics athletes and the community.
Special Olympics Vision
· The Special Olympics Movement will transform communities by inspiring people throughout the world to open their minds, accept and include people with intellectual disabilities and thereby celebrate the similarities common to all people.
History and Leadership
· Special Olympics began in 1968 with the First International Special Olympics Games at Soldier Field in Chicago. Since then, millions have benefited from the Movement.
· Timothy P. Shriver is the Chairman, President, and CEO of Special Olympics.
· The Board Vice Chairs are Nadia Comaneci, Olympic Gymnastics Gold Medalist; and Raymond J. Lane, Partner, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers.
· Eunice Kennedy Shriver is the Founder of Special Olympics and its Honorary Chairperson.
·
Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd.) AVSM PVSM VM is the Chairman, President Special Olympics Bharat Uttar Pradesh and National Trustee of Special Olympics Bharat.
Air Marshal Ashok Goel Chairman SOB-UP,
Air Cmdr NK Bhoan, AOC , Kanpur
Dr. Amitav Mishra, Vice Chairman & State Program Director SOB-UP
Philosophy
Special Olympics is founded on the belief that people with intellectual disabilities can, with proper instruction and encouragement, learn, enjoy and benefit from participation in individual and team sports. Special Olympics also believes that through millions of individual acts of inclusion where people with and without intellectual disabilities are brought together, long-standing myths are dispelled, negative attitudes changed and new opportunities to embrace and celebrate people with intellectual disabilities are created.
Special Olympics Initiatives
·
Special Olympics Healthy Athletes™ includes dental screening, vision examinations, hearing examinations, injury prevention, and nutrition. These screenings and exams are conducted at Special Olympics local, State, National and World Games and are provided at no cost to Special Olympics athletes.
· Special Olympics Get Into It™ is a K-12 service-learning curriculum developed to introduce Special Olympics and explain intellectual disabilities to young people and encourage them to become involved in the Movement and work to dispel the myths and stereotypes that surround people with intellectual disabilities.
· Special Olympics Athlete Leadership Programs (ALPs) offer athletes the opportunity to take active leadership roles both on and off the playing field. Athletes serve on the Boards of Directors, officiate competitions, coach other athletes and make decisions about the future of Special Olympics.
· Special Olympics Unified Sports™ is a program that brings together people with and without intellectual disabilities on the same athletic team.
· Family Support Network gives families a support system within Special Olympics.
Benefits
· Individuals who compete in Special Olympics develop improved physical fitness and motor skills and greater self confidence. They exhibit courage and enthusiasm and build lasting friendships. These life skills enhance their ability to live normal productive lives.
· More than ever, Special Olympics athletes hold jobs, own homes, go to school and successfully confront life challenges on a daily basis.
Funding
· Special Olympics receives funding in support of the Movement from individuals, corporations, foundations, government and restricted grants. The vast majority of funding received is from individuals through the Special Olympics direct mail program.
Eligibility
· To be eligible to participate in Special Olympics, an athlete must be at least eight years old and identified by an agency or professional as having one of the following conditions: mental retardation, cognitive delays as measured by formal assessment, or significant learning or vocational problems due to cognitive delay that have required specially designed instruction.
For More Information:
About Special Olympics, please visit. www.specialolympics.org
Special Olympics is an international Movement dedicated to empowering people with intellectual disabilities to become physically fit, productive and respected members of society, though sports training and athletic competition. The Movement involves:
• 2.5 million Athletes, with a goal of 4 million by 2009
• More than 200 Special Olympics programs in 170 countries
• 26 Olympic-type summer and winter sports
• 7 regional offices around the world, including Belgium, Egypt, Zimbabwe, India, China, Panama, and USA
• Approximately 750,000 volunteers
• More than 2, 00,000 coaches
• More than 20,000 competitions around the world each year
Special Olympics Mission
· To provide year-round sports training and athletic competition in a variety of Olympic-type sports for children and adults with intellectual disabilities, giving them continuing opportunities to develop physical fitness, demonstrate courage, experience joy and participate in a sharing of gifts, skills and friendship with their families, other Special Olympics athletes and the community.
Special Olympics Vision
· The Special Olympics Movement will transform communities by inspiring people throughout the world to open their minds, accept and include people with intellectual disabilities and thereby celebrate the similarities common to all people.
History and Leadership
· Special Olympics began in 1968 with the First International Special Olympics Games at Soldier Field in Chicago. Since then, millions have benefited from the Movement.
· Timothy P. Shriver is the Chairman, President, and CEO of Special Olympics.
· The Board Vice Chairs are Nadia Comaneci, Olympic Gymnastics Gold Medalist; and Raymond J. Lane, Partner, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers.
· Eunice Kennedy Shriver is the Founder of Special Olympics and its Honorary Chairperson.
·
Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd.) AVSM PVSM VM is the Chairman, President Special Olympics Bharat Uttar Pradesh and National Trustee of Special Olympics Bharat.
Air Marshal Ashok Goel Chairman SOB-UP,
Air Cmdr NK Bhoan, AOC , Kanpur
Dr. Amitav Mishra, Vice Chairman & State Program Director SOB-UP
Philosophy
Special Olympics is founded on the belief that people with intellectual disabilities can, with proper instruction and encouragement, learn, enjoy and benefit from participation in individual and team sports. Special Olympics also believes that through millions of individual acts of inclusion where people with and without intellectual disabilities are brought together, long-standing myths are dispelled, negative attitudes changed and new opportunities to embrace and celebrate people with intellectual disabilities are created.
Special Olympics Initiatives
·
Special Olympics Healthy Athletes™ includes dental screening, vision examinations, hearing examinations, injury prevention, and nutrition. These screenings and exams are conducted at Special Olympics local, State, National and World Games and are provided at no cost to Special Olympics athletes.
· Special Olympics Get Into It™ is a K-12 service-learning curriculum developed to introduce Special Olympics and explain intellectual disabilities to young people and encourage them to become involved in the Movement and work to dispel the myths and stereotypes that surround people with intellectual disabilities.
· Special Olympics Athlete Leadership Programs (ALPs) offer athletes the opportunity to take active leadership roles both on and off the playing field. Athletes serve on the Boards of Directors, officiate competitions, coach other athletes and make decisions about the future of Special Olympics.
· Special Olympics Unified Sports™ is a program that brings together people with and without intellectual disabilities on the same athletic team.
· Family Support Network gives families a support system within Special Olympics.
Benefits
· Individuals who compete in Special Olympics develop improved physical fitness and motor skills and greater self confidence. They exhibit courage and enthusiasm and build lasting friendships. These life skills enhance their ability to live normal productive lives.
· More than ever, Special Olympics athletes hold jobs, own homes, go to school and successfully confront life challenges on a daily basis.
Funding
· Special Olympics receives funding in support of the Movement from individuals, corporations, foundations, government and restricted grants. The vast majority of funding received is from individuals through the Special Olympics direct mail program.
Eligibility
· To be eligible to participate in Special Olympics, an athlete must be at least eight years old and identified by an agency or professional as having one of the following conditions: mental retardation, cognitive delays as measured by formal assessment, or significant learning or vocational problems due to cognitive delay that have required specially designed instruction.
For More Information:
About Special Olympics, please visit. www.specialolympics.org
Saturday, March 28, 2009
The 1999 Kargil War Not a Generals’ Victory
The 1999 Kargil War Not a Generals’ Victory
By Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd)
Published : January 2009
New Delhi. The 1999 Kargil War caused the biggest .utter in the Indian subcontinent, bringing India and Pakistan close to a nuclear holocaust. Despite the fact that the last two wars between the two neighbours had been way back, in 1965 and 1971, it happened because the Indians were lax as usual and the Pakistanis in a mischief mode, also as usual.
Much has been written about the event, including by the Chief of Army Staff at that time, Gen V P Malik, as also by the then Home Minister L K Advani. There was an official inquiry by India’s renowned strategic affairs analyst, K Subrahmanyam, but he has pointed out to this writer that he did not go into operational details and accordingly, could not comment on certain weaknesses some top Indian commanders displayed. The mid-level and younger officers and men though fought well, and even though many of them perished, the victory actually belonged to them.
The Pakistani military leadership as well as its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) have always been indulging in nasty manoeuvers against India. But that they dared to infiltrate troops into India and tried to capture a part of Kashmir yet again was possible because we were negligent, partly because we generally are so by temperament and partly because the government of the day, led by Mr A B Vajpayee, had ordered the forces to be “soft” on Pakistan because of the “positive” talks between him and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif towards maintaining peace and building friendship.
While opportunities for peace must be seized by politicians, there was no reason for the armed forces – the Army in particular – to be lax. In fact, the Pakistani move as it happened had been debated in the Indian Army for years and had been taken up as a strong possibility in periodic exercises. Yet, when it was happening, we were blind to it.
In the foreword to Brig Gurmeet Kanwal’s book, Indian Army Vision 2020, Gen Malik says: “The Fact is that even after 60 years of independence, knowledge and experience of defence and military issues is lacking in most of our political leaders and civilian bureaucrats.”
But the General has not shared the lapses and neglect of responsibilities of the Army leadership, particularly of the sector commanders, and to an extent, his own. Some of these are by now, well known, including the mindset of the 15 Corps Commander, Lt Gen Krishan Pal, who insisted that there were only a handful of infiltrators – 60 to 80 – and that none of them was a Pakistani soldier. He committed troops without allowing them adequate weapons and strength, and if facts given by Lt Gen Y M Bammi in a book are taken into account, he punished an officer, Brig Devinder Singh, who wanted better preparations insisting that there were a large number of Pakistani soldiers inside the Indian territory.
The officer had eight battalions under his charge, and by all accounts, he fought very well, leading the troops from the front. Gen Malik himself has been seen and heard praising this officer at various fora. Yet, Brig Devinder Singh’s career was cut short to save those who were wrong.
To recall, the biggest players of the Kargil War were:
a. The Government at the highest echelon of the Political Leadership;
b. The top rung of the military leadership – The Army Chief, GOC-in-C Northern Command, 15 Corps Cdr , and the 3 Div Cdr;
c. The intelligence agencies, primarily the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Research and Analysis Wing (RAW);
d. The Indian Air Force (IAF) and its exercise of Air Power.
e. The dedicated and committed soldiers and the middle and junior level officers.
THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
The NDA government was at its pinnacle in May 1998, having successfully conducted the nuclear test that month and having put India in the list of Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). The aim now was to resolve the Kashmir issue by seeking wellmeaning diplomatic and economic relations with Pakistan.
Mrs Indira Gandhi had also attempted that, after the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, by trying to tell the then Pakistani leader Z A Bhutto that only peace between the two neighbours would ensure their long-term economic prosperity and growth. In fact, she went out of the way to ensure a comfortable stay for Bhutto, personally choosing even the tapestry of the room he was to stay in Simla during the 1972 summit between them, and by telling Indian officers that the Pakistani leader must be given the respect due to a visiting head of government or state, and not that of a country which had lost war. She agreed to Bhutto’s request to release nearly 96,000 Pakistani POWs, and Bhutto promised to work for peace with India.
Needless to say that he backed out.
Mrs Gandhi did what was right in those circumstances. But the lesson for the Indian leadership was to understand that Pakistan is never to be trusted. Islamabad built a network of nuclear capability and missiles by smuggling and deceit, lying even to Washington which gave it liberal aid as a friend and mentor.
Prime Minister Vajpayee and his deputy, Advani, tried to establish a political dialogue with Pakistan. Coupled with the nuclear tests, a success with Islamabad would give them respect in the history books forever.
Intelligence organizations were told to be easy, and the armed forces stopped looking for periodic information from them. There was the February 1999 Bus Yatra (journey) by Vajpayee to Lahore to meet with his counterpart, Nawaz Sharif. It was a goodwill mission, seemingly wellresponded by Sharif.But the fact that the then Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, Gen Parvez Musharraf, did not pay due respects to the visiting Indian leader during the visit, should have been an indication of the Pakistani army’s intentions; that it had no intention to accommodate the rapprochement that the political leadership in Islamabad perhaps then wanted.
It may be noted that as a Brigadier on assignment with a think tank in London, Musharraf had written in a thesis that Pakistan must capture Kashmir to secure water from the Himalayan rivers for itself. As a Chief of Staff, he would certainly try to realize his thoughts.
It is a well known fact that the Srinagar-Leh axis runs closest to the Line of Control (LOC) in the Dras–Kargil Sector. Also, the terrain on the Indian side is hostile to defend, whereas the terrain on the Pakistan side is favorable to launch an offensive. Strategically, Pakistan has always intended to block, disrupt or permanently dislocate it.
My first posting after being commissioned into the IAF in 1963 was to Jammu in Squadron 43, flying Dakotas. The main task was to operate to Kargil and Thoise to provide logistic support to the troops deployed in forward areas. I was fortunate to be deputed as the Base Commander of Air Force clement at Kargil from Feb to May 1964, working along with 121 (Ind) Infantry Brigade.
It was an education.
Brig Chopra, an Armoured Corps officer who was the Brigade Commander, always used to say that the Dras-Kargil Sector was the most sensitive because of its close proximity to the LOC as well as the terrain factors.
Much later, during a course in 1980-81 at the Army’s prestigious College of Combat at MHOW, now renamed Army War College, this lesson was repeated by none other than the Commandant, Lt Gen K Sunderji.
He became the Chief of Army Staff later, and had a sand-model exercise conducted, visualizing exactly what the Pakistanis did to occupy Kargil. A counteroffensive plan was discussed at the 15 Corps Headquarters. I was privy to that along with Lt Gen B C Nanda, Army Commander Northern Command, Air Marshal M M Singh, AOC-in-C Western Command and some other officers.
That in 1998 and 1999, the top brass in the same sector was oblivious to the risk from the Pakistani Army, is absolutely un-understanable.
RAW’S AVIATION RESEARCH CENTRE (ARC)
Till mid-1997, a user could approach ARC only through the RAW HQ for its operational tasks. This used to delay the process by a week. The legendary Billy Bedi, who headed ARC for several years, initiated userfriendly steps, and a required mission could be launched within hours. Analytical reports were delivered ASAP, within hours if required.
Top 3-star officers from the services were invited and informed of the ARC’s capabilities in airborne electronic intelligence, and the then Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal A Y Tipnis, commended the ARC.
THE KARGIL SURPRISE
In May 1999, once reports of Pakistani infiltration had come in, Army’s Directorate General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) sought Air Reconnaissance Mission in the Dras-Kargil sector.
I personally flew missions beginning May 13 and soon, on May 18, we had pictures of six Pakistani Army MI-17 helicopters parked in the Mushok Valley area on the Indian side. These photographs were shown to the then Defence Minister George Fernandes, who was aghast and observed that this could have happened only after months of planning and preparation.
Gen Malik also praised ARC for the inputs but strangely, till some three weeks after this input, Lt Gen Krishan Pal still seemed to believe that there were only a few infiltrators on the Indian side. He himself said in a TV statement that he revised his opinion only after India lost many lives in the Battle of Tololing (June 13).
Did the Army HQ fail to convey him the confirmation of the Pakistani helicopters, and presence, inside India? Or he just insisted on ignoring reality?
Perhaps, the Army should come out with the truth after an honest introspection.
For record, Gen Malik had told ARC that he had no hesitation in admitting that its inputs enabled the Army to correlate its operational plans and that otherwise the causality figures could have been much higher.
The gap between this statement and Lt Gen Krishanpal’s observation is glaring, and led to a tragic loss of lives.
THE INDIAN AIR FORCE
IAF does not have combat helicopters for high altitude offensive operations, and on May 25, it was decided to commit aircraft to neutralize the Pakistan-occupied positions on the Indian side.
Initially, IAF lost two aircraft and one Mi 17 helicopter.
An IAF spokesman pointed out that the air operations in Kargil had taken place in an environment that was totally new in the history of world military aviation. The IAF had to unlearn what had been taught before, as it was operating with a new set of paradigms such as the ballistic trajectory of weapons in high altitude operations.
A well-respected Air Marshal Vinod Patney, Air Officer Commanding in-Chief (AOC-in-C) Western Air Command, conducted the air operations after a short course to his officers in precision bombing.
THE SUBRAHMANYAM COMMITTEE
The Subrahmanyam Committee did not attribute any intelligence failures to RAW or ARC, but highlighted equipment inadequacies like the lack of high resolution, all-weather and sub-meter imaging capability.
Lack of UAVs and better coordination between the security agencies was also mentioned but it acknowledged that the IB Director did convey certain inputs on activities in areas under the Gilgit-based FCNA (Force Commander orthern Areas) of Pakistan to the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the Cabinet Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Director-General Military Operations (DGMO).
There is apparently a general lack of awareness of the critical importance of, and the need for, assessed intelligence, at all levels. Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) reports do not receive the attention they deserve at the political and higher bureaucratic levels. One officer in a listening post mentions that a senior bureaucrat asked him about some entertainment programmes only in a span of one year.
It is clear that a Kargil-type situation could have been avoided either by plugging gaps as in Siachin, or by a credible declaratory policy of swiftly punishing wanton and willful violation of the sanctity of the LOC, as the Committee observed.
THE NUCLEAR TANGLE
Kargil was a stupid adventure for Pakistan.
Threats from Islamabad about using nuclear weapons were considered but dismissed as Pakistan would not have been more stupid to invite destructive retaliation.
The Kargil War has also helped strengthen India’s doctrine that while India would not first use nuclear weapons, it would retaliate by inflicting massive destruction.
CONCLUSION
There is much evidence available to suggest that the intelligence agencies, RAW and IB, had in fact provided their political masters and military commanders with ample warning about Pakistani intentions and activities.
In any case, lack of strategic intelligence could have been made up by the observation on the ground through scouts and patrolling. One did not have to get basic inputs about the Pakistani infiltration from shepherds, which as a matter fact, happened. After all, the Pakistani infiltration was spread over a large front.
India deliberately limited its response to the eviction of Pakistani soldiers.
But many of our officers and men died needlessly as we were neither prepared for the war nor ready to absorb the inputs towards efficient and better coordination between the security forces.
The victory indeed belonged to those officers and men who fought, died or survived, but won.
Not the Generals.
By Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd)
Published : January 2009
New Delhi. The 1999 Kargil War caused the biggest .utter in the Indian subcontinent, bringing India and Pakistan close to a nuclear holocaust. Despite the fact that the last two wars between the two neighbours had been way back, in 1965 and 1971, it happened because the Indians were lax as usual and the Pakistanis in a mischief mode, also as usual.
Much has been written about the event, including by the Chief of Army Staff at that time, Gen V P Malik, as also by the then Home Minister L K Advani. There was an official inquiry by India’s renowned strategic affairs analyst, K Subrahmanyam, but he has pointed out to this writer that he did not go into operational details and accordingly, could not comment on certain weaknesses some top Indian commanders displayed. The mid-level and younger officers and men though fought well, and even though many of them perished, the victory actually belonged to them.
The Pakistani military leadership as well as its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) have always been indulging in nasty manoeuvers against India. But that they dared to infiltrate troops into India and tried to capture a part of Kashmir yet again was possible because we were negligent, partly because we generally are so by temperament and partly because the government of the day, led by Mr A B Vajpayee, had ordered the forces to be “soft” on Pakistan because of the “positive” talks between him and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif towards maintaining peace and building friendship.
While opportunities for peace must be seized by politicians, there was no reason for the armed forces – the Army in particular – to be lax. In fact, the Pakistani move as it happened had been debated in the Indian Army for years and had been taken up as a strong possibility in periodic exercises. Yet, when it was happening, we were blind to it.
In the foreword to Brig Gurmeet Kanwal’s book, Indian Army Vision 2020, Gen Malik says: “The Fact is that even after 60 years of independence, knowledge and experience of defence and military issues is lacking in most of our political leaders and civilian bureaucrats.”
But the General has not shared the lapses and neglect of responsibilities of the Army leadership, particularly of the sector commanders, and to an extent, his own. Some of these are by now, well known, including the mindset of the 15 Corps Commander, Lt Gen Krishan Pal, who insisted that there were only a handful of infiltrators – 60 to 80 – and that none of them was a Pakistani soldier. He committed troops without allowing them adequate weapons and strength, and if facts given by Lt Gen Y M Bammi in a book are taken into account, he punished an officer, Brig Devinder Singh, who wanted better preparations insisting that there were a large number of Pakistani soldiers inside the Indian territory.
The officer had eight battalions under his charge, and by all accounts, he fought very well, leading the troops from the front. Gen Malik himself has been seen and heard praising this officer at various fora. Yet, Brig Devinder Singh’s career was cut short to save those who were wrong.
To recall, the biggest players of the Kargil War were:
a. The Government at the highest echelon of the Political Leadership;
b. The top rung of the military leadership – The Army Chief, GOC-in-C Northern Command, 15 Corps Cdr , and the 3 Div Cdr;
c. The intelligence agencies, primarily the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Research and Analysis Wing (RAW);
d. The Indian Air Force (IAF) and its exercise of Air Power.
e. The dedicated and committed soldiers and the middle and junior level officers.
THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
The NDA government was at its pinnacle in May 1998, having successfully conducted the nuclear test that month and having put India in the list of Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). The aim now was to resolve the Kashmir issue by seeking wellmeaning diplomatic and economic relations with Pakistan.
Mrs Indira Gandhi had also attempted that, after the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, by trying to tell the then Pakistani leader Z A Bhutto that only peace between the two neighbours would ensure their long-term economic prosperity and growth. In fact, she went out of the way to ensure a comfortable stay for Bhutto, personally choosing even the tapestry of the room he was to stay in Simla during the 1972 summit between them, and by telling Indian officers that the Pakistani leader must be given the respect due to a visiting head of government or state, and not that of a country which had lost war. She agreed to Bhutto’s request to release nearly 96,000 Pakistani POWs, and Bhutto promised to work for peace with India.
Needless to say that he backed out.
Mrs Gandhi did what was right in those circumstances. But the lesson for the Indian leadership was to understand that Pakistan is never to be trusted. Islamabad built a network of nuclear capability and missiles by smuggling and deceit, lying even to Washington which gave it liberal aid as a friend and mentor.
Prime Minister Vajpayee and his deputy, Advani, tried to establish a political dialogue with Pakistan. Coupled with the nuclear tests, a success with Islamabad would give them respect in the history books forever.
Intelligence organizations were told to be easy, and the armed forces stopped looking for periodic information from them. There was the February 1999 Bus Yatra (journey) by Vajpayee to Lahore to meet with his counterpart, Nawaz Sharif. It was a goodwill mission, seemingly wellresponded by Sharif.But the fact that the then Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, Gen Parvez Musharraf, did not pay due respects to the visiting Indian leader during the visit, should have been an indication of the Pakistani army’s intentions; that it had no intention to accommodate the rapprochement that the political leadership in Islamabad perhaps then wanted.
It may be noted that as a Brigadier on assignment with a think tank in London, Musharraf had written in a thesis that Pakistan must capture Kashmir to secure water from the Himalayan rivers for itself. As a Chief of Staff, he would certainly try to realize his thoughts.
It is a well known fact that the Srinagar-Leh axis runs closest to the Line of Control (LOC) in the Dras–Kargil Sector. Also, the terrain on the Indian side is hostile to defend, whereas the terrain on the Pakistan side is favorable to launch an offensive. Strategically, Pakistan has always intended to block, disrupt or permanently dislocate it.
My first posting after being commissioned into the IAF in 1963 was to Jammu in Squadron 43, flying Dakotas. The main task was to operate to Kargil and Thoise to provide logistic support to the troops deployed in forward areas. I was fortunate to be deputed as the Base Commander of Air Force clement at Kargil from Feb to May 1964, working along with 121 (Ind) Infantry Brigade.
It was an education.
Brig Chopra, an Armoured Corps officer who was the Brigade Commander, always used to say that the Dras-Kargil Sector was the most sensitive because of its close proximity to the LOC as well as the terrain factors.
Much later, during a course in 1980-81 at the Army’s prestigious College of Combat at MHOW, now renamed Army War College, this lesson was repeated by none other than the Commandant, Lt Gen K Sunderji.
He became the Chief of Army Staff later, and had a sand-model exercise conducted, visualizing exactly what the Pakistanis did to occupy Kargil. A counteroffensive plan was discussed at the 15 Corps Headquarters. I was privy to that along with Lt Gen B C Nanda, Army Commander Northern Command, Air Marshal M M Singh, AOC-in-C Western Command and some other officers.
That in 1998 and 1999, the top brass in the same sector was oblivious to the risk from the Pakistani Army, is absolutely un-understanable.
RAW’S AVIATION RESEARCH CENTRE (ARC)
Till mid-1997, a user could approach ARC only through the RAW HQ for its operational tasks. This used to delay the process by a week. The legendary Billy Bedi, who headed ARC for several years, initiated userfriendly steps, and a required mission could be launched within hours. Analytical reports were delivered ASAP, within hours if required.
Top 3-star officers from the services were invited and informed of the ARC’s capabilities in airborne electronic intelligence, and the then Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal A Y Tipnis, commended the ARC.
THE KARGIL SURPRISE
In May 1999, once reports of Pakistani infiltration had come in, Army’s Directorate General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) sought Air Reconnaissance Mission in the Dras-Kargil sector.
I personally flew missions beginning May 13 and soon, on May 18, we had pictures of six Pakistani Army MI-17 helicopters parked in the Mushok Valley area on the Indian side. These photographs were shown to the then Defence Minister George Fernandes, who was aghast and observed that this could have happened only after months of planning and preparation.
Gen Malik also praised ARC for the inputs but strangely, till some three weeks after this input, Lt Gen Krishan Pal still seemed to believe that there were only a few infiltrators on the Indian side. He himself said in a TV statement that he revised his opinion only after India lost many lives in the Battle of Tololing (June 13).
Did the Army HQ fail to convey him the confirmation of the Pakistani helicopters, and presence, inside India? Or he just insisted on ignoring reality?
Perhaps, the Army should come out with the truth after an honest introspection.
For record, Gen Malik had told ARC that he had no hesitation in admitting that its inputs enabled the Army to correlate its operational plans and that otherwise the causality figures could have been much higher.
The gap between this statement and Lt Gen Krishanpal’s observation is glaring, and led to a tragic loss of lives.
THE INDIAN AIR FORCE
IAF does not have combat helicopters for high altitude offensive operations, and on May 25, it was decided to commit aircraft to neutralize the Pakistan-occupied positions on the Indian side.
Initially, IAF lost two aircraft and one Mi 17 helicopter.
An IAF spokesman pointed out that the air operations in Kargil had taken place in an environment that was totally new in the history of world military aviation. The IAF had to unlearn what had been taught before, as it was operating with a new set of paradigms such as the ballistic trajectory of weapons in high altitude operations.
A well-respected Air Marshal Vinod Patney, Air Officer Commanding in-Chief (AOC-in-C) Western Air Command, conducted the air operations after a short course to his officers in precision bombing.
THE SUBRAHMANYAM COMMITTEE
The Subrahmanyam Committee did not attribute any intelligence failures to RAW or ARC, but highlighted equipment inadequacies like the lack of high resolution, all-weather and sub-meter imaging capability.
Lack of UAVs and better coordination between the security agencies was also mentioned but it acknowledged that the IB Director did convey certain inputs on activities in areas under the Gilgit-based FCNA (Force Commander orthern Areas) of Pakistan to the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the Cabinet Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Director-General Military Operations (DGMO).
There is apparently a general lack of awareness of the critical importance of, and the need for, assessed intelligence, at all levels. Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) reports do not receive the attention they deserve at the political and higher bureaucratic levels. One officer in a listening post mentions that a senior bureaucrat asked him about some entertainment programmes only in a span of one year.
It is clear that a Kargil-type situation could have been avoided either by plugging gaps as in Siachin, or by a credible declaratory policy of swiftly punishing wanton and willful violation of the sanctity of the LOC, as the Committee observed.
THE NUCLEAR TANGLE
Kargil was a stupid adventure for Pakistan.
Threats from Islamabad about using nuclear weapons were considered but dismissed as Pakistan would not have been more stupid to invite destructive retaliation.
The Kargil War has also helped strengthen India’s doctrine that while India would not first use nuclear weapons, it would retaliate by inflicting massive destruction.
CONCLUSION
There is much evidence available to suggest that the intelligence agencies, RAW and IB, had in fact provided their political masters and military commanders with ample warning about Pakistani intentions and activities.
In any case, lack of strategic intelligence could have been made up by the observation on the ground through scouts and patrolling. One did not have to get basic inputs about the Pakistani infiltration from shepherds, which as a matter fact, happened. After all, the Pakistani infiltration was spread over a large front.
India deliberately limited its response to the eviction of Pakistani soldiers.
But many of our officers and men died needlessly as we were neither prepared for the war nor ready to absorb the inputs towards efficient and better coordination between the security forces.
The victory indeed belonged to those officers and men who fought, died or survived, but won.
Not the Generals.
IAF Helicopters
IAF Helicopters• IAF to acquire Eurocopter Fennec• RfP for Heavy Lift helicopters next year• IAF's Helicopter induction programme will complete in 10 years
By Gulshan Luthra and Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd)
Published : August 2007
New Delhi. The Indian Air Force (IAF) will buy a large number of Eurocopter Fennec AS 550 C3 helicopters to replace its ageing fleet of Chetak and Cheetah helicopters.
This was indicated by Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major in an interview here with India Strategic. He did not name the helicopter make but as the Indian Army has already chosen the Eurocopter over Bell 407 this year, it is apparently going to be the same machine for the IAF as well as the Indian Navy and Coast Guard.
It may be noted that former Defence Secretary Shekhar Dutt, who introduced the offsets concept in defence procurement, has also ensured that the three services and the coast guard go in for the same system if their required specifications are the same or nearly the same.
Earlier, each service could buy a system from the same manufacturer individually under different contracts. Now, the overall requirement is being negotiated and options are kept.
The air chief said that the IAF was working on acquiring various types of helicopters, including the Mi 17 1Vs, and even some heavy lift 20-ton machines. He did not give machine-wise acquisition period but said that it would take about 10 years to complete the induction programme.
"IAF's requirement of helicopters will be met by induction of additional helicopters for various roles in a phased manner during the next two five-year plan periods. This will offset the force-depletion due to phase-outs."
Plans also include induction of combat helicopters.
It may be recalled that IAF has already decided to buy 80 Mi 17 1V helicopters in a follow-on order to replace the older machines as well as to make up for the depleting strength of this multi-role machine.
"As the helicopter is a versatile machine and has multi-role capability during peace and war," IAF's operational philosophy gives due emphasis on what is required and in how many numbers.
"The role and numbers are in accordance with our operational plans" and that as there was indeed "some force depletion" due to the phase out of older machines, there was some urgency and the government was giving it due attention, he said.
The air chief disclosed that IAF would float the RfP for the heavy lift helicopters next year - possibly in fiscal April 2008 - March 2009 - to who ever manufactures them and that the machines would be inducted after thorough technical trials and examination of financial details as per the DPP 2006, possibly within three years after that.
There was an initial, and immediate, requirement of about a dozen heavy lift helicopters.
IAF has executed major relief missions during calamities like tsunami and snow storms but it is hampered badly by the lack of heavy lift helicopters that can carry substantial load on the one hand and withstand the mountain drafts on the other.
It had acquired a small number of Mi 26 heavy lift helicopters from the Soviet Union in the 1980s, but their manufacture was stopped in the disintegration process of that country. There is a big problem now in their maintenance as there are virtually no spares available.
IAF pilots swear by the reliability of the 8-rotor Mi 26 helicopters, the biggest ever in the world, but of course, Russia does not make them any more, times have changed and technology has improved towards digital systems for optimized performance.
The only 20-ton helicopter available in the market today is the twin-rotor Boeing CH 47, which the US company had displayed at the Aero India air show in February 2007 at Bangalore. Test rides were given to air force personnel to showcase this helicopter's advanced capabilities.
There are some indications though that either the Russian or Europeans could come up with new machines, but after how long is the crucial question. The war or terror, as being demonstrated in Afghanistan, has thrown up new requirements. Both the NATO and US forces there are "hungry" for helicopters.
As for India, nearly all the helicopters with the Indian armed forces are around 20 or more than 20 years old, and the Aérospatiale Alouette and Lama helicopters, called Chetak or Cheetah in accordance with the roles assigned them by different services in India, have been the prime machines with them ever since the 1960s when they were first inducted. Cheetah is the more powerful variant though.
Both these have also been upgraded with better Turbomeca 333-2B engines to Chetan and Cheetal versions, giving them higher carrying capacity as well as higher altitude capability.
But the armed forces need new generation and new helicopters.
The acquisition of Fennec will fill in a wide gap, but in terms of different roles, the Army and Air Force will have to be given helicopters suited to different requirements.
Fennec in French is the name of an elusive North African desert fox, with oversized ears. The helicopter, used mostly in France but also in several other countries, is named after that animal.
Unconfirmed reports indicate that a requirement of small, agile helicopters that can fly in a city landscape crowded with high-rise buildings, is also being considered. It may be a while however when this type of machine is available.
A helicopter that fits this requirement is still being developed by Bell Helicopter in collaboration with an Israeli company.
None of the Services in India has a dedicated attack aircraft, and till that is acquired, some of the Eurocopters would be used in that role. Other roles envisaged are reconnaissance, electronic warfare, anti-tank role, and also injection and extrication of personnel from the battlefield. In its armed version, the Eurocopter is fitted with coaxial guns, rockets and air-to-air missiles.
Fennec makes a substantial use of composite materials, in body, rotor and rotor blades and tail rotor. These materials are described by the company as "rugged, low cost, efficient and corrosion-free."
The existing number of Alouette and Lama variants operational in India is estimated at a little more than 400, including some with private Indian organisations and business houses. But eventually, as the assembly and progressive manufacture of the aircraft is done at the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL), around 600 of the new Fennec helicopters could be made in India, depending upon the price and required rate of production.
The Indian Army recently chose the European Eurocopter Fennec over the US Bell 407, and its technical evaluation report is being processed at the Ministry of Defence. Discussions are beginning with Eurocopter for the best possible technical specifications within a given price.
The government though has still not officially disclosed if the Fennec has been chosen by the Indian Army. But India Strategic had learnt reliably, as reported in its April issue, that the Army had indeed preferred this helicopter in its technical trials.
The army is buying 197 helicopters for multi-role deployment, 60 of them in flyaway condition and the rest gradually assembled in India by the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL).
The number of Fennecs for IAF would be less than that, but set to nearly match that of the Army over the years as the requirements grow.
Indications at the recent Paris Air Show were that Safran, which makes the helicopter's Turbomeca Arrius engine, will further fine-tune the system for still better performance. The engine has the Full-Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) for optimized performance.
Air Chief Marshal Major, who is a helicopter pilot, visited various aircraft and helicopter companies at the Show and evinced keen interest in the development of the new systems.
He pointed out though that IAF was a fighting force and that its options for various aircraft, helicopters, weapons and systems were in accordance with the calculated Air Staff Requirements (ASR) and not based on what machine which air chief flew.
"We want the best in fighters, best in onboard systems, best in weapons, best in helicopters, and the best of everything for our officers and men," he told India Strategic.
As for the Eurocopter, or the replacement for the Cheetahs, the air chief did not disclose if the IAF would also buy some helicopters in a flyaway condition or they would be assembled at HAL and then delivered to the IAF.
Eurocopter, Turbomeca and Safran are now part of the aerospace major, the European Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS) company.
Eurocopter is also supplying the Turbomeca 333-2B engines for the Dhruv, the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) designed and developed by HAL for the air force, army, navy, coast guard and police forces.
The helicopter requirements of all the services in India, including those paramilitary and police, has grown substantially, even for peace time and disaster relief. So it is not just a case of only replacing the existing stock with them but also of meeting the new needs. However, the new needs also warrant different types.
IAF also needs new helicopters for VVIP requirements, and the process to acquire them is already under way. These helicopters would be equipped with special protection measures.
As for the Mi 17 1V, IAF is phasing out the older versions of this machine but retaining and upgrading the 1V model. As this helicopter is already flying with IAF from around 20 years, the order for them is a follow-on step and does not require floating a fresh tender.
Mi 17 1V is in fact the work horse of IAF, and also the backbone of its helicopter fleet.
As for the heavy lift helicopters, IAF is keen to lay its hands on whatever is available. When there is a civil emergency, it is tasked to help. But it has no helicopters or not in adequate numbers.
The Mi 26 is as big as the An 12 transport aircraft that the IAF once used - now phased out - and it could easily go to 16000 feet, and ferry even heavy guns like Bofors to that height. But how and where do you get the spares from? is the big question.
Designated "Halo' by NATO, the Mi 26 is the most powerful helicopter ever made. It was inducted by the Soviet forces in 1983 and a little later by India in small numbers in two batches.
Chinook was first deployed 50 years ago in the Vietnam war. But the machine sold today is entirely new, except that it has the same twin-rotor concept. It has a sophisticated glass cockpit and very powerful General Electric engines. Due to its versatile capability, it was chosen by the US Air Force (USAF) for the future Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) machine although its competitors have sought rebids and the US Department of Defense is likely to decide on that by November.
Air Chief Marshal Major said that that the Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) 2006 would facilitate the induction of various systems as the IAF could conduct trials speedily and the Ministry of Defence could also do the required clearance likewise.
He said that due attention was also being given to meet the requirement of combat helicopters.
The Indian Air Force uses the Mi 25 Soviet vintage helicopters, but as the 1999 Kargil War showed, IAF needs machines which can go to 25,000 or 26,000 feet, or even higher.
The Mi 25, although a good machine, has a service ceiling of 14,500 feet.
Most important though, over the last 15 years, the technology in every thing, the platforms and the systems they carry, has changed tremendously in what is called as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). So whatever is acquired today, has to be in line with any anticipated technological developments over the next 30 to 40 years.
Any platform has to have a modular approach to enable replacement of equipment that gets outdated with better and contemporary systems as they evolve.
By Gulshan Luthra and Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd)
Published : August 2007
New Delhi. The Indian Air Force (IAF) will buy a large number of Eurocopter Fennec AS 550 C3 helicopters to replace its ageing fleet of Chetak and Cheetah helicopters.
This was indicated by Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major in an interview here with India Strategic. He did not name the helicopter make but as the Indian Army has already chosen the Eurocopter over Bell 407 this year, it is apparently going to be the same machine for the IAF as well as the Indian Navy and Coast Guard.
It may be noted that former Defence Secretary Shekhar Dutt, who introduced the offsets concept in defence procurement, has also ensured that the three services and the coast guard go in for the same system if their required specifications are the same or nearly the same.
Earlier, each service could buy a system from the same manufacturer individually under different contracts. Now, the overall requirement is being negotiated and options are kept.
The air chief said that the IAF was working on acquiring various types of helicopters, including the Mi 17 1Vs, and even some heavy lift 20-ton machines. He did not give machine-wise acquisition period but said that it would take about 10 years to complete the induction programme.
"IAF's requirement of helicopters will be met by induction of additional helicopters for various roles in a phased manner during the next two five-year plan periods. This will offset the force-depletion due to phase-outs."
Plans also include induction of combat helicopters.
It may be recalled that IAF has already decided to buy 80 Mi 17 1V helicopters in a follow-on order to replace the older machines as well as to make up for the depleting strength of this multi-role machine.
"As the helicopter is a versatile machine and has multi-role capability during peace and war," IAF's operational philosophy gives due emphasis on what is required and in how many numbers.
"The role and numbers are in accordance with our operational plans" and that as there was indeed "some force depletion" due to the phase out of older machines, there was some urgency and the government was giving it due attention, he said.
The air chief disclosed that IAF would float the RfP for the heavy lift helicopters next year - possibly in fiscal April 2008 - March 2009 - to who ever manufactures them and that the machines would be inducted after thorough technical trials and examination of financial details as per the DPP 2006, possibly within three years after that.
There was an initial, and immediate, requirement of about a dozen heavy lift helicopters.
IAF has executed major relief missions during calamities like tsunami and snow storms but it is hampered badly by the lack of heavy lift helicopters that can carry substantial load on the one hand and withstand the mountain drafts on the other.
It had acquired a small number of Mi 26 heavy lift helicopters from the Soviet Union in the 1980s, but their manufacture was stopped in the disintegration process of that country. There is a big problem now in their maintenance as there are virtually no spares available.
IAF pilots swear by the reliability of the 8-rotor Mi 26 helicopters, the biggest ever in the world, but of course, Russia does not make them any more, times have changed and technology has improved towards digital systems for optimized performance.
The only 20-ton helicopter available in the market today is the twin-rotor Boeing CH 47, which the US company had displayed at the Aero India air show in February 2007 at Bangalore. Test rides were given to air force personnel to showcase this helicopter's advanced capabilities.
There are some indications though that either the Russian or Europeans could come up with new machines, but after how long is the crucial question. The war or terror, as being demonstrated in Afghanistan, has thrown up new requirements. Both the NATO and US forces there are "hungry" for helicopters.
As for India, nearly all the helicopters with the Indian armed forces are around 20 or more than 20 years old, and the Aérospatiale Alouette and Lama helicopters, called Chetak or Cheetah in accordance with the roles assigned them by different services in India, have been the prime machines with them ever since the 1960s when they were first inducted. Cheetah is the more powerful variant though.
Both these have also been upgraded with better Turbomeca 333-2B engines to Chetan and Cheetal versions, giving them higher carrying capacity as well as higher altitude capability.
But the armed forces need new generation and new helicopters.
The acquisition of Fennec will fill in a wide gap, but in terms of different roles, the Army and Air Force will have to be given helicopters suited to different requirements.
Fennec in French is the name of an elusive North African desert fox, with oversized ears. The helicopter, used mostly in France but also in several other countries, is named after that animal.
Unconfirmed reports indicate that a requirement of small, agile helicopters that can fly in a city landscape crowded with high-rise buildings, is also being considered. It may be a while however when this type of machine is available.
A helicopter that fits this requirement is still being developed by Bell Helicopter in collaboration with an Israeli company.
None of the Services in India has a dedicated attack aircraft, and till that is acquired, some of the Eurocopters would be used in that role. Other roles envisaged are reconnaissance, electronic warfare, anti-tank role, and also injection and extrication of personnel from the battlefield. In its armed version, the Eurocopter is fitted with coaxial guns, rockets and air-to-air missiles.
Fennec makes a substantial use of composite materials, in body, rotor and rotor blades and tail rotor. These materials are described by the company as "rugged, low cost, efficient and corrosion-free."
The existing number of Alouette and Lama variants operational in India is estimated at a little more than 400, including some with private Indian organisations and business houses. But eventually, as the assembly and progressive manufacture of the aircraft is done at the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL), around 600 of the new Fennec helicopters could be made in India, depending upon the price and required rate of production.
The Indian Army recently chose the European Eurocopter Fennec over the US Bell 407, and its technical evaluation report is being processed at the Ministry of Defence. Discussions are beginning with Eurocopter for the best possible technical specifications within a given price.
The government though has still not officially disclosed if the Fennec has been chosen by the Indian Army. But India Strategic had learnt reliably, as reported in its April issue, that the Army had indeed preferred this helicopter in its technical trials.
The army is buying 197 helicopters for multi-role deployment, 60 of them in flyaway condition and the rest gradually assembled in India by the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL).
The number of Fennecs for IAF would be less than that, but set to nearly match that of the Army over the years as the requirements grow.
Indications at the recent Paris Air Show were that Safran, which makes the helicopter's Turbomeca Arrius engine, will further fine-tune the system for still better performance. The engine has the Full-Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) for optimized performance.
Air Chief Marshal Major, who is a helicopter pilot, visited various aircraft and helicopter companies at the Show and evinced keen interest in the development of the new systems.
He pointed out though that IAF was a fighting force and that its options for various aircraft, helicopters, weapons and systems were in accordance with the calculated Air Staff Requirements (ASR) and not based on what machine which air chief flew.
"We want the best in fighters, best in onboard systems, best in weapons, best in helicopters, and the best of everything for our officers and men," he told India Strategic.
As for the Eurocopter, or the replacement for the Cheetahs, the air chief did not disclose if the IAF would also buy some helicopters in a flyaway condition or they would be assembled at HAL and then delivered to the IAF.
Eurocopter, Turbomeca and Safran are now part of the aerospace major, the European Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS) company.
Eurocopter is also supplying the Turbomeca 333-2B engines for the Dhruv, the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) designed and developed by HAL for the air force, army, navy, coast guard and police forces.
The helicopter requirements of all the services in India, including those paramilitary and police, has grown substantially, even for peace time and disaster relief. So it is not just a case of only replacing the existing stock with them but also of meeting the new needs. However, the new needs also warrant different types.
IAF also needs new helicopters for VVIP requirements, and the process to acquire them is already under way. These helicopters would be equipped with special protection measures.
As for the Mi 17 1V, IAF is phasing out the older versions of this machine but retaining and upgrading the 1V model. As this helicopter is already flying with IAF from around 20 years, the order for them is a follow-on step and does not require floating a fresh tender.
Mi 17 1V is in fact the work horse of IAF, and also the backbone of its helicopter fleet.
As for the heavy lift helicopters, IAF is keen to lay its hands on whatever is available. When there is a civil emergency, it is tasked to help. But it has no helicopters or not in adequate numbers.
The Mi 26 is as big as the An 12 transport aircraft that the IAF once used - now phased out - and it could easily go to 16000 feet, and ferry even heavy guns like Bofors to that height. But how and where do you get the spares from? is the big question.
Designated "Halo' by NATO, the Mi 26 is the most powerful helicopter ever made. It was inducted by the Soviet forces in 1983 and a little later by India in small numbers in two batches.
Chinook was first deployed 50 years ago in the Vietnam war. But the machine sold today is entirely new, except that it has the same twin-rotor concept. It has a sophisticated glass cockpit and very powerful General Electric engines. Due to its versatile capability, it was chosen by the US Air Force (USAF) for the future Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) machine although its competitors have sought rebids and the US Department of Defense is likely to decide on that by November.
Air Chief Marshal Major said that that the Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) 2006 would facilitate the induction of various systems as the IAF could conduct trials speedily and the Ministry of Defence could also do the required clearance likewise.
He said that due attention was also being given to meet the requirement of combat helicopters.
The Indian Air Force uses the Mi 25 Soviet vintage helicopters, but as the 1999 Kargil War showed, IAF needs machines which can go to 25,000 or 26,000 feet, or even higher.
The Mi 25, although a good machine, has a service ceiling of 14,500 feet.
Most important though, over the last 15 years, the technology in every thing, the platforms and the systems they carry, has changed tremendously in what is called as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). So whatever is acquired today, has to be in line with any anticipated technological developments over the next 30 to 40 years.
Any platform has to have a modular approach to enable replacement of equipment that gets outdated with better and contemporary systems as they evolve.
IAF to buy 40 more Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers
IAF to buy 40 more Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers
Navy to follow with 17
By Gulshan Luthra and Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd)
Published : February 2008
New Delhi. The Indian Air Force (IAF) will buy 40 more Hawk Advanced Jet trainers (AJTs).
Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal F H Major told India Strategic that IAF's original plan was to induct 122 AJTs but the acquisition got delayed by nearly a quarter of the century, and when the deal was signed in March 2004, it was only for 66 aircraft.
IAF needs more AJTs, and they would be acquired in accordance with the emerging requirements and acquisition of newer medium and air dominance fighters, he said.
Of the 66 AJTs that IAF has contracted to buy from the British BAE Systems, 24 are being acquired in a flyaway condition and the rest in Semi Knocked Down (SKD) and Completely Knocked Down (CKD) kits for progressive manufacture within India using indigenous components.
BAE Systems has already begun transferring technology and equipment to the public sector aviation giant HAL at its Bangalore facility under the deal.
Naval sources indicated that the Indian Navy was also acquiring the same Hawks to maintain commonality with IAF, rather than its navalized T-45 Goshawk version built by the US Boeing company in collaboration with the BAE Systems.
The Goshawk imparts actual aircraft carrier training, but the Indian Navy has opted to prefer the Hawk, and is likely to buy 16 to 20 of these aircraft. The figure mentioned though is for 17 Hawks.
The US Navy has trained several Indian Navy pilots on Goshawks since 2006 at its Pensacola Naval Air Station in Florida.
The Indian naval Hawks would be modified slightly for simulated carrier landings, but on the ground.The Navy should be expecting its Gorshkov aircraft carrier from Russia in two to three years along with Mig 29K aircraft, and training of the pilots for them has to commence well in time. It takes five years to train a fighter pilot from the induction stage.
Air Chief Marshal Major said that while the future requirements would be defined with emerging needs, both the air force and navy would place order for the newer jets with HAL, which is tasked with indigenous manufacture.
He described the Hawk 132 that India is buying to its specifications as an excellent aircraft. Pointing out to its ultra-modern glass cockpit, he said that a pilot trained on a Hawk could easily walk into another modern aircraft like the SU 30, or the coming Medium-Multi Role Combat Jets without much conversion training.
The Air Chief described training as a very important element of combat, pointing out that today, every system from radar to missiles to aircraft was coming with simulators.
He said that the IAF Flying Training Establishment (FTE) at Bidar, the designated home of the Hawks in Karnataka, was a futuristic flight training academy with new equipment and a 9000 feet runway, much different than it was just a few years ago.
All the 66 aircraft would be based there.
"Framing of the flying and operating procedures in the local flying area will take top priority," according to Air Officer Commanding Air Commodore Ramesh Rai.
The first two twin-seater Hawks had reached Bidar on November 12, flown by a mix crew of BAE Systems and IAF pilots from BAE Systems’ Technical Training Academy at Warton in UK. After some preliminary formalities, instructor's conversion began on them right away.
Wg Cdr Pankaj Jain and Sqd Ldr Tarun Hindwani were the first two pilots to land the aircraft in India at Jamnagar, from where they moved to Bidar.
By Feb-end, 10 of the newer gleaming jets would at this base. BAE Systems and HAL are scheduled to complete supply of all the 66 aircraft by 2011.
According to Air Marshal Satish Inamdar (Retd), who had worked on the AJT project, India could eventually acquire or build at least 200 of the Hawk jets. “They have potential for growth in line with modernisation of the Indian Air Force.”It may be noted that IAF suffered several accidents in the late 1970s and early 1980s as fighter pilots graduated from basic jet trainers to the supersonic Mig 21 without intermediary - or Stage III - training. When the then Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Dilbagh Singh, drew prime minister Indira Gandhi's attention to it, she immediately called for action.
Due to political and bureaucratic delays, their supplies have only begun now.
Air Chief Marshal Major said that IAF had trained 12 instructors and 75 pilots in Britain, and that all of them had excelled in flying.
BAE Systems Managing Director Training Solutions, Mark Parkinson, says that the British firm also trained 100 engineers.
A company statement quoted him as saying: 'We have completed conversion training of experienced IAF Flying Instructors to become instructor pilots on the Indian Hawk - these instructors are returning to India to train the Indian Air Force's next generation of frontline pilots.'
BAE Systems sold more that US$ 27 billion worth of military hardware and services in 2006.
Navy to follow with 17
By Gulshan Luthra and Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd)
Published : February 2008
New Delhi. The Indian Air Force (IAF) will buy 40 more Hawk Advanced Jet trainers (AJTs).
Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal F H Major told India Strategic that IAF's original plan was to induct 122 AJTs but the acquisition got delayed by nearly a quarter of the century, and when the deal was signed in March 2004, it was only for 66 aircraft.
IAF needs more AJTs, and they would be acquired in accordance with the emerging requirements and acquisition of newer medium and air dominance fighters, he said.
Of the 66 AJTs that IAF has contracted to buy from the British BAE Systems, 24 are being acquired in a flyaway condition and the rest in Semi Knocked Down (SKD) and Completely Knocked Down (CKD) kits for progressive manufacture within India using indigenous components.
BAE Systems has already begun transferring technology and equipment to the public sector aviation giant HAL at its Bangalore facility under the deal.
Naval sources indicated that the Indian Navy was also acquiring the same Hawks to maintain commonality with IAF, rather than its navalized T-45 Goshawk version built by the US Boeing company in collaboration with the BAE Systems.
The Goshawk imparts actual aircraft carrier training, but the Indian Navy has opted to prefer the Hawk, and is likely to buy 16 to 20 of these aircraft. The figure mentioned though is for 17 Hawks.
The US Navy has trained several Indian Navy pilots on Goshawks since 2006 at its Pensacola Naval Air Station in Florida.
The Indian naval Hawks would be modified slightly for simulated carrier landings, but on the ground.The Navy should be expecting its Gorshkov aircraft carrier from Russia in two to three years along with Mig 29K aircraft, and training of the pilots for them has to commence well in time. It takes five years to train a fighter pilot from the induction stage.
Air Chief Marshal Major said that while the future requirements would be defined with emerging needs, both the air force and navy would place order for the newer jets with HAL, which is tasked with indigenous manufacture.
He described the Hawk 132 that India is buying to its specifications as an excellent aircraft. Pointing out to its ultra-modern glass cockpit, he said that a pilot trained on a Hawk could easily walk into another modern aircraft like the SU 30, or the coming Medium-Multi Role Combat Jets without much conversion training.
The Air Chief described training as a very important element of combat, pointing out that today, every system from radar to missiles to aircraft was coming with simulators.
He said that the IAF Flying Training Establishment (FTE) at Bidar, the designated home of the Hawks in Karnataka, was a futuristic flight training academy with new equipment and a 9000 feet runway, much different than it was just a few years ago.
All the 66 aircraft would be based there.
"Framing of the flying and operating procedures in the local flying area will take top priority," according to Air Officer Commanding Air Commodore Ramesh Rai.
The first two twin-seater Hawks had reached Bidar on November 12, flown by a mix crew of BAE Systems and IAF pilots from BAE Systems’ Technical Training Academy at Warton in UK. After some preliminary formalities, instructor's conversion began on them right away.
Wg Cdr Pankaj Jain and Sqd Ldr Tarun Hindwani were the first two pilots to land the aircraft in India at Jamnagar, from where they moved to Bidar.
By Feb-end, 10 of the newer gleaming jets would at this base. BAE Systems and HAL are scheduled to complete supply of all the 66 aircraft by 2011.
According to Air Marshal Satish Inamdar (Retd), who had worked on the AJT project, India could eventually acquire or build at least 200 of the Hawk jets. “They have potential for growth in line with modernisation of the Indian Air Force.”It may be noted that IAF suffered several accidents in the late 1970s and early 1980s as fighter pilots graduated from basic jet trainers to the supersonic Mig 21 without intermediary - or Stage III - training. When the then Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Dilbagh Singh, drew prime minister Indira Gandhi's attention to it, she immediately called for action.
Due to political and bureaucratic delays, their supplies have only begun now.
Air Chief Marshal Major said that IAF had trained 12 instructors and 75 pilots in Britain, and that all of them had excelled in flying.
BAE Systems Managing Director Training Solutions, Mark Parkinson, says that the British firm also trained 100 engineers.
A company statement quoted him as saying: 'We have completed conversion training of experienced IAF Flying Instructors to become instructor pilots on the Indian Hawk - these instructors are returning to India to train the Indian Air Force's next generation of frontline pilots.'
BAE Systems sold more that US$ 27 billion worth of military hardware and services in 2006.
Transformation IAF
Transformation IAF$ 70 billion to be spent over the next 20 Years
By Gulshan Luthra and Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd)
Published : February 2008
New Delhi. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has initiated a major transformation process, requiring around US$ 70 billion over the next few years.
According to an India Strategic study, except for the newly acquired SU 30MKIs, IAF needs to replace and augment nearly 100 per cent of its fighter, transport and helicopter fleets for the simple reason that all of them are around 20 years old or more, and would need replacement even after their useful lives are extended by around 10 years or so with new onboard avionics and missiles as the airframes and engines remain the same.
Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal F H Major told India Strategic in an interview “that the process to transform the force had begun and that the next 10 years would be important in this regard” as there would be positive, all-round changes.
From aircraft to airbases with precision approach and surveillance radars, there would be visible changes by 2015, the Air Chief observed adding that the emphasis was on all-weather, round-the-clock operational capability.
He did not comment on the financial figure calculated by us but said that the IAF “plan is three-pronged – to preserve, upgrade and acquire” and that “adequate budgetary support is available for procurement of new aircraft.”
He also said that the direct acquisition of SU 30MKIs from Russia had been completed and their that their production was “proceeding satisfactorily” at the HAL facilities in India.
As a thumb rule, it takes about $ 1.5 billion to set up a fighter squadron, inclusive of 18 aircraft, systems and weapons with supporting equipment. Even if the combat squadron strength is maintained at 35 – if not the original sanctioned 45 – the cost comes to nearly $ 50 billion. Except that the SU 30 MKIs, of which the IAF is acquiring 230 aircraft, would be somewhat cheaper because the contracts were signed in the late 1990s.
The problem for the overall transformation has arisen because nearly all acquisitions for the armed forces and intelligence agencies were stopped by the then government in 1990, and the process to re-equip was triggered only after Pakistani troops occupied the Kargil heights, leading to the 1999 war.
The other factor was the rising number of air crashes, both because there were no Advanced Jet Trainers (AJTs) and also as some of the aircraft were getting old.
In an earlier study, we had considered a figure between $ 35 to 45 billion, but a revision is imperative and $ 70 billion looks more or less a realistic figure.
The Air Force now needs to replace as well as augment its aircraft and systems in line with modern technology. In war-fighting, there is no choice but to have an edge, and that too, a decisive edge.
About the ageing aircraft and their declining strength, the Air Chief said: “With regard to the hardware, it is our endeavour to make good all deficiencies, upgrade the existing equipment and procure state-of-the-art weapon systems.”
Logically, there should have been periodic replacement of equipment with all the forces, but that did not happen, and as for the IAF, except the SU 30 MKIs, its entire fleet has to undergo a transformation.
Apparently, the costs would keep rising if timely decisions are not taken. The country would have to pay dearly for any political or procedural bottlenecks.
IAF has already phased out nearly two-thirds of its 300 Mig 21 aircraft, as well as Mig 23-MF, (six) Mig 25 spy jets, Hunters, Canberras and some transporters over the last 10 years.
Of the 300-plus Mig 21s, which formed the mainstay fighting force of the IAF, about 125 are being retained and upgraded to the Mig 21Bis category. That is, the platform and engines are same but overhauled, and the onboard avionics and missiles are the latest.
The Air Chief said that the IAF had already completed the upgrade process for 100 Mig 21Bis, fitting them with Beyond the Visual Range (BVR) missiles, a new navigation-attack radar and other weapons “dramatically improving their capability.”
The pilot workload is lower and “its flight safety record has been very good.”
The mainstay role however has been taken over now by the SU 30MKI air dominance fighters, which can fly far and stay in the air for up to 8 hours. By any standard, these are formidable jets, capable of effectively countering any threat.
Notably, although now some aircraft are planned to be used for up to 40 years with periodic technological upgrades, the earlier aircraft were designed for a useful life of 20 years.
The SU 30MKI is designed for periodic technological insertions like all modern aircraft.
Air Chief Marshal Major said that the IAF “started upgrading its combat fleet a few years ago to enhance their operational capability” and that in addition to the SU 30MIs under procurement, “the planned induction of Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MRCAs), the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas and the 5th Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) – being developed with Russia – would arrest the declining combat squadrons strength.”
It may be noted that our study takes into account acquisition of 230 SU 30 MKIs, 126 MRCAs, new transport aircraft, new helicopters, AWACs, midair refuelers, pilot-less Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and possibly Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), radars, Aerostats and secure satellite and other communications, contemporary electronic systems as well as a periodic cost escalation between .5 to 1 per cent per year.
The IAF also needs to update and upgrade its aircraft pens around the country, and work in that direction has also started. Most of the existing hangars at its airbases were designed for small aircraft like the Mig 21 but today’s SU 30MKIs, MRCA or FGFA would be bigger and it’s prudent to move assets from one place to another, particularly during operations.
The cost of an SU 30 MKI, fitted with some French and Israeli avionics, is not known but an MRCA should be anywhere between $ 40 to 50 million, depending upon the number of engines, fire control radars like AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array), Targeting pods and some sophisticated gadgetry.
Boeing, which has offered its twin-engine F 18 Super Hornet in the MRCA category as the replacement for the Mig 21, has set a price tag of $ 49.9 million.
Boeing’s President of Precision Engagement and Mobility Systems Chris Chadwick, who has been coordinating his company’s potential sales to India, told us that this price included the AESA radar and most of the equipment on board the Super Hornets supplied to the US Navy, which in fact, flies the world’s second-largest air force.
About the ongoing modernization, Air Chief Marshal Major said: “Of the available fleets, the Mig 21Bis, Mig 27 and Jaguar aircraft have already been upgraded. “Upgrades of the Mirage 2000 and Mig 29 aircraft is being processed.”
As for the transport and helicopter fleets, he said that the IAF had already signed an agreement for six Lockheed Martin C 130Js transport aircraft while 24 combat helicopters and 12 heavy lift helicopters would also be acquired. A plan to buy 80 Mi 17 helicopters from Russia to augment the fleet was already being pursued.
“The IAF is actively pursuing a comprehensive plan to upgrade its helicopter fleet, by upgrading older aircraft and inducting new ones,” he said adding that the existing “Mi 17s multi role helicopters and Mi 35 combat helicopters will be upgraded.”
The Air Chief also pointed out that the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) built by the public sector HAL was already operational and being continuously improved” and that “the armed version of the ALH has also flown while its attack version, the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH), is in the pipeline.”
HAL Chairman and Managing Director Ashok Baweja had told India Strategic earlier that HAL would also develop 60 hi-altitude helicopters for Siachin and Kargil type of heights in the Himalayas. This is likely to be a helicopter other than the LCH as this would have to be made from special materials capable of withstanding the extremes of cold.
Air Chief Marshal Major said: “A number of procurement schemes are being processed and we will, in future, have a mix of indigenous and imported aircraft to meet our operational requirements, which include heavy, medium-lift and utility helicopters.
“These helicopters will be inducted in a phased manner, during the next two five-year plans (ending 2017).
The Air Chief pointed out that the demands on the IAF transport fleet are growing due to the enhanced national and international commitments” and that “they will only increase in future.”
“Our fleet is set to expand to meet these enhanced tasks and a variety of procurement schemes are being progressed,” he said, adding that there are plans to enhance our air transportation capabilities in the Medium Transport Aircraft (MTA) category,” which will be produced in a joint venture with Russia.
Air Chief Marshal Major said that the IAF reviewed its operational strategy and philosophy constantly, “in step with the changes in the security scenario.”
“Concurrently, the equipment, weapons and systems are modernized, which in turn necessitates changes in the organization structure and training, and all these changes are incorporate in the IAF Doctrine.”
By Gulshan Luthra and Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd)
Published : February 2008
New Delhi. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has initiated a major transformation process, requiring around US$ 70 billion over the next few years.
According to an India Strategic study, except for the newly acquired SU 30MKIs, IAF needs to replace and augment nearly 100 per cent of its fighter, transport and helicopter fleets for the simple reason that all of them are around 20 years old or more, and would need replacement even after their useful lives are extended by around 10 years or so with new onboard avionics and missiles as the airframes and engines remain the same.
Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal F H Major told India Strategic in an interview “that the process to transform the force had begun and that the next 10 years would be important in this regard” as there would be positive, all-round changes.
From aircraft to airbases with precision approach and surveillance radars, there would be visible changes by 2015, the Air Chief observed adding that the emphasis was on all-weather, round-the-clock operational capability.
He did not comment on the financial figure calculated by us but said that the IAF “plan is three-pronged – to preserve, upgrade and acquire” and that “adequate budgetary support is available for procurement of new aircraft.”
He also said that the direct acquisition of SU 30MKIs from Russia had been completed and their that their production was “proceeding satisfactorily” at the HAL facilities in India.
As a thumb rule, it takes about $ 1.5 billion to set up a fighter squadron, inclusive of 18 aircraft, systems and weapons with supporting equipment. Even if the combat squadron strength is maintained at 35 – if not the original sanctioned 45 – the cost comes to nearly $ 50 billion. Except that the SU 30 MKIs, of which the IAF is acquiring 230 aircraft, would be somewhat cheaper because the contracts were signed in the late 1990s.
The problem for the overall transformation has arisen because nearly all acquisitions for the armed forces and intelligence agencies were stopped by the then government in 1990, and the process to re-equip was triggered only after Pakistani troops occupied the Kargil heights, leading to the 1999 war.
The other factor was the rising number of air crashes, both because there were no Advanced Jet Trainers (AJTs) and also as some of the aircraft were getting old.
In an earlier study, we had considered a figure between $ 35 to 45 billion, but a revision is imperative and $ 70 billion looks more or less a realistic figure.
The Air Force now needs to replace as well as augment its aircraft and systems in line with modern technology. In war-fighting, there is no choice but to have an edge, and that too, a decisive edge.
About the ageing aircraft and their declining strength, the Air Chief said: “With regard to the hardware, it is our endeavour to make good all deficiencies, upgrade the existing equipment and procure state-of-the-art weapon systems.”
Logically, there should have been periodic replacement of equipment with all the forces, but that did not happen, and as for the IAF, except the SU 30 MKIs, its entire fleet has to undergo a transformation.
Apparently, the costs would keep rising if timely decisions are not taken. The country would have to pay dearly for any political or procedural bottlenecks.
IAF has already phased out nearly two-thirds of its 300 Mig 21 aircraft, as well as Mig 23-MF, (six) Mig 25 spy jets, Hunters, Canberras and some transporters over the last 10 years.
Of the 300-plus Mig 21s, which formed the mainstay fighting force of the IAF, about 125 are being retained and upgraded to the Mig 21Bis category. That is, the platform and engines are same but overhauled, and the onboard avionics and missiles are the latest.
The Air Chief said that the IAF had already completed the upgrade process for 100 Mig 21Bis, fitting them with Beyond the Visual Range (BVR) missiles, a new navigation-attack radar and other weapons “dramatically improving their capability.”
The pilot workload is lower and “its flight safety record has been very good.”
The mainstay role however has been taken over now by the SU 30MKI air dominance fighters, which can fly far and stay in the air for up to 8 hours. By any standard, these are formidable jets, capable of effectively countering any threat.
Notably, although now some aircraft are planned to be used for up to 40 years with periodic technological upgrades, the earlier aircraft were designed for a useful life of 20 years.
The SU 30MKI is designed for periodic technological insertions like all modern aircraft.
Air Chief Marshal Major said that the IAF “started upgrading its combat fleet a few years ago to enhance their operational capability” and that in addition to the SU 30MIs under procurement, “the planned induction of Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MRCAs), the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas and the 5th Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) – being developed with Russia – would arrest the declining combat squadrons strength.”
It may be noted that our study takes into account acquisition of 230 SU 30 MKIs, 126 MRCAs, new transport aircraft, new helicopters, AWACs, midair refuelers, pilot-less Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and possibly Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), radars, Aerostats and secure satellite and other communications, contemporary electronic systems as well as a periodic cost escalation between .5 to 1 per cent per year.
The IAF also needs to update and upgrade its aircraft pens around the country, and work in that direction has also started. Most of the existing hangars at its airbases were designed for small aircraft like the Mig 21 but today’s SU 30MKIs, MRCA or FGFA would be bigger and it’s prudent to move assets from one place to another, particularly during operations.
The cost of an SU 30 MKI, fitted with some French and Israeli avionics, is not known but an MRCA should be anywhere between $ 40 to 50 million, depending upon the number of engines, fire control radars like AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array), Targeting pods and some sophisticated gadgetry.
Boeing, which has offered its twin-engine F 18 Super Hornet in the MRCA category as the replacement for the Mig 21, has set a price tag of $ 49.9 million.
Boeing’s President of Precision Engagement and Mobility Systems Chris Chadwick, who has been coordinating his company’s potential sales to India, told us that this price included the AESA radar and most of the equipment on board the Super Hornets supplied to the US Navy, which in fact, flies the world’s second-largest air force.
About the ongoing modernization, Air Chief Marshal Major said: “Of the available fleets, the Mig 21Bis, Mig 27 and Jaguar aircraft have already been upgraded. “Upgrades of the Mirage 2000 and Mig 29 aircraft is being processed.”
As for the transport and helicopter fleets, he said that the IAF had already signed an agreement for six Lockheed Martin C 130Js transport aircraft while 24 combat helicopters and 12 heavy lift helicopters would also be acquired. A plan to buy 80 Mi 17 helicopters from Russia to augment the fleet was already being pursued.
“The IAF is actively pursuing a comprehensive plan to upgrade its helicopter fleet, by upgrading older aircraft and inducting new ones,” he said adding that the existing “Mi 17s multi role helicopters and Mi 35 combat helicopters will be upgraded.”
The Air Chief also pointed out that the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) built by the public sector HAL was already operational and being continuously improved” and that “the armed version of the ALH has also flown while its attack version, the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH), is in the pipeline.”
HAL Chairman and Managing Director Ashok Baweja had told India Strategic earlier that HAL would also develop 60 hi-altitude helicopters for Siachin and Kargil type of heights in the Himalayas. This is likely to be a helicopter other than the LCH as this would have to be made from special materials capable of withstanding the extremes of cold.
Air Chief Marshal Major said: “A number of procurement schemes are being processed and we will, in future, have a mix of indigenous and imported aircraft to meet our operational requirements, which include heavy, medium-lift and utility helicopters.
“These helicopters will be inducted in a phased manner, during the next two five-year plans (ending 2017).
The Air Chief pointed out that the demands on the IAF transport fleet are growing due to the enhanced national and international commitments” and that “they will only increase in future.”
“Our fleet is set to expand to meet these enhanced tasks and a variety of procurement schemes are being progressed,” he said, adding that there are plans to enhance our air transportation capabilities in the Medium Transport Aircraft (MTA) category,” which will be produced in a joint venture with Russia.
Air Chief Marshal Major said that the IAF reviewed its operational strategy and philosophy constantly, “in step with the changes in the security scenario.”
“Concurrently, the equipment, weapons and systems are modernized, which in turn necessitates changes in the organization structure and training, and all these changes are incorporate in the IAF Doctrine.”
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